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ABSTRACT
I examine a metaphysical theory which accounts for the indeterminism
of which quantum mechanics is both cause and symptom. This theory,
which I call subjunctive realism, is based on a many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics, where the multiple possible results
of observations describe branching states of the object system. Our
universe is but one branch of a larger “multiverse”: quantum-mechanical
observations provide information regarding the area of the multiverse
where the observer is located. An account of personal identity which can
cope with the demands of the theory is also provided, along with an
exploration of some ramifications of the theory for questions regarding
quantum theory and personal identity.
3Subjunctive Realism
Introduction
This thesis presents a metaphysical theory which I call subjunctive realism. Its
premise is simple. The world as we know it is but one of the many nomologically
possible worlds: the other ones exist too. It is a philosophical formulation of the
Everett-Wheeler “many-worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics, which
says that whenever the laws of quantum mechanics give probabilities for different
outcomes of measurements, each probability is realised: the universe, including
the observer, “splits”, with one branch for each possibility. Such an interpretation
implies that the future for any observer is subject to the probabilities experienced
in quantum-mechanical observations, and is therefore open, while the
“multiverse” as a whole is described by the deterministic Schrödinger equations.
I begin by examining the philosophical basis for thinking that our future may be
open. I discuss briefly the impact of relativity and quantum theory on classical
notions of causation, and make a distinction between subjective probability and
genuine chance. I indicate that any system where chance plays a part is
indeterministic, and give reasons for supposing that our world is such a system. I
adopt Everett’s approach to the indeterminism apparent in quantum-mechanical
observations, and outline the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Three metaphysical pictures of the world are then explored: the “naive” model, in
the formulation given by Storrs McCall, the four-dimensional or timeless model,
and finally, subjunctive realism, reconciling problems which cause conflict
between the other two models. I also compare subjunctive realism with the modal
realism of David Lewis, a theory which proposes a still greater number of
logically (as opposed to nomologically) possible worlds.
Both subjunctive and modal realism define actuality as an indexical concept.
Truth-functional empirical propositions, as propositions which state the actuality
or otherwise of states of affairs, must perforce have indexical components and
thereby assert the location of the speaker within the multiverse; as such they are
metaphysical propositions. Parallel accounts of world-identity and personal
identity which can locate the speaker within the branching multiverse are
4required. The approach is along the lines of Parfit and Lewis, with an emphasis
on psychological contiguity. Two important results arise from these accounts.
The first is that the theory provides an explanation for the apparent anisotropy of
time without recourse to the postulation of ontological differences to account for
the asymmetry between the past and the future. The second, more provocative
result is that, given an appropriate understanding of trans-world identity, we may
be considered to be concurrently inhabiting multiple subjectively indis-
tinguishable worlds. 9
This is what my thesis does say. There are many other things which it does not
say.  It should be emphasised that this is not a work of physics: I do not present
any new experimental data or interpret it in a novel fashion. This is, however, in
part a work about physics: I am examining the philosophical implications of a
physical theory which I leave intact. I do not claim that the Everett-Wheeler
interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct. I am not qualified to do so and it
is outside the scope of this thesis: nor is it possible to argue for or against it on
empirical grounds, since it receives no experimental support which is not also
enjoyed by the prevailing Copenhagen interpretation. I do argue, however, that
the Everett-Wheeler interpretation, if true, clears up some metaphysical
difficulties to which the Copenhagen interpretation is susceptible, and provides a
much more interesting universe in the bargain. If it has a drawback, it is that it
involves a multiplication of entities which would make Occam turn in his grave.
Nor do I make any claims about free will. Perhaps an enthusiast might discern in
a many-worlds metaphysics more opportunity for the exercise of free will, but I
do not think that the removal of determinism at the world-level makes one any
less subject to the laws of physics. Hypothetical but extremely unlikely
alterations in the operation of the brain by quantum events would if anything
decrease one’s role in making decisions. Neither am I interested here in exploring
causation or the nature of time itself.
                                                
5The end of classical physics
At the end of the nineteenth century, the project of physics was nearing
completion. Gravity, motion, electromagnetism, and the atom were all, it seemed,
understood; a complete description of a mechanistic universe, in terms of the
theories of Euclid, Newton, Maxwell, Rutherford and others, seemed imminent.
For the philosopher, whose traditional job has been to rush in where scientists
fear to tread, there was little to do: physics would soon explain everything, and
speculative philosophy —metaphysics in particular— seemed not only pointless
but intellectually suspect, given the spectacular success of the physical sciences
in comparison with the embarrassingly slow and frequently retrograde
meanderings of philosophers. The retreat of philosophers from worldly matters
towards logical and linguistic analysis is perhaps indicative of this apprehension,
reaching its apogee in the “elimination of metaphysics” by the logical positivists:
In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and
normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the
alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless.1
Within a generation, however, classical physics had been swept away, replaced
by a new physics, based on the general theory of relativity and the quantum
theory. Together, the two theories effectively destroyed the premise upon which
empirical science had been predicated: the idea that the world, independent of
ourselves, was made up of determinate and measurable phenomena, whose
interactions could be understood in terms of equations describing the positions
and momenta of the fundamental “world-stuff”. The theory of relativity makes it
impossible in some instances to decide whether one event occurs before another:
quantum theory makes untenable the idea of “world-stuff” even having
determinate positions or momenta.2
Relativity, it seems, has become part of the mainstream of thought, and little
troubles us: in any case we are unlikely to have to deal with its effects in our
everyday lives, unless public transport becomes very much faster. Quantum
theory, on the other hand, is still quite obscure, due in part perhaps to the horribly
complicated mathematics involved: in greater part, however, because it
undermines our intuitive ideas about causation and reality. Our intuitions about
                                                
1Carnap (1932), pp 61-62.
2Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that a particle can have a determinate position or
momentum, but not position and  momentum. It is important to distinguish between
“determinate” and “determinable”: see “Is the universe indeterministic”, below.
6the world are similar to those held in classical physics: we believe that the world
is made up of matter, which is pushed around by other matter in certain ways,
subject to determinate laws which say which bit of matter will go where. Unless
we are dualists, we think that such a description pretty well sums up what
happens in the world, and, save for a problematic area within the skull,
mechanistic explanations are adequate. These intuitions serve us well in our day-
to-day existence: we do not have to worry about quantum effects when we go
shopping or take the dog for a walk. Classical physics suffices for most
phenomena on the human scale. Yet this matter of which we are all made is, at
the lowest level of description, not subject to the determinate laws which hold at
other levels. The fundamental “particles”3 which compose our bodies –there are
some ten thousand billion billion– obey the laws of quantum mechanics.
The laws of quantum mechanics are statistical: although they are extremely
accurate when dealing with huge numbers of particles, such as make up the
familiar objects of experience, they are unable to make predictions when dealing
with the individual particles themselves.
The principle of local causation
Most of our talk about causation refers to macroscopic objects. Consider a
paradigmatic case: the game of billiards. We say that the cue ball causes the
object ball to move in a certain way, depending on its angle and speed at the
moment of impact. The balls, however, are not indivisible entities: they are
composed of a great many smaller objects standing in certain relations. Any
description of the movements of the balls is shorthand for a description of the
movements of the smaller particles of which the balls are made. There are several
possible levels of explanation, from the mechanical to the quantum-mechanical.
Every instance of causation takes place on the lowest, sub-microscopic level, and
this micro-causation occurs locally, between objects which are spatially and
temporally adjacent: there is no “action-at-a-distance”. Where instances of
apparent non-adjacent causation are investigated they are found to involve
intermediate events which form causal chains. An event can only be affected by,
or itself affect, entities within its past or future “light-cones”: an event taking
place one million kilometres distant, for example, cannot affect events here until
                                                
3The notion of a fundamental particle is rather hazy in the post-quantum world. I shall use the
term, however, without prejudice as to what exactly is described by the word. In any case,
“fundamental particle” means something like “that of which, in the final analysis, all matter is
composed”, whether they be particles, waves, fields, probability fluctuations, vibrating strings, or
anything else.
7at least  3.34 seconds have elapsed, as this is the minimum amount of time that
the fastest of all causal phenomena—electromagnetic radiation—will take to
traverse the distance.4
Is the universe deterministic?
Each state of the world occurs as a result of states immediately preceding it.
There are physical laws which describe this evolution, and in so far as these laws
are determinate, the universe proceeds in a determinate fashion. Given a complete
description of the positions and momenta of all particles within a closed system5,
and the determinate laws which apply to those particles one could in principle
predict the future of that system with complete accuracy. This is of course the
Laplacian apotheosis of Newtonian physics: a mighty intelligence, with a
complete knowledge of the laws of nature and a complete catalogue of the
positions and velocities of everything in the universe in any given instant6, could
extrapolate all future events: a trick different only in degree from the prediction
of eclipses or the conjunctions of celestial bodies.7
Such prediction is subject to two practical difficulties (apart from the sheer
quantity of empirical data which would need to be acquired). The first comes
from the increasingly popular field known as chaos theory. One of the central
results of the theory is that there are systems within the world which are highly
sensitive to their initial conditions. In such systems, such as economies, animal
populations, weather systems, and executive toys, arbitrarily close initial
                                                
4There are exceptions to the principle of local causation: the so-called “EPR paradox”, for
example. I shall suggest an interpretation of this and other related phenomena which preserves
local causation.
5A closed system, as the name implies, is one which is not subject to causal influence from
outside forces. In the real world, any system (with the possible exception of the entire universe)
will of necessity be open:  the earth, for example, is affected by gravitational, electromagnetic and
physical phenomena, coming from the rest of the Solar System and the universe at large. The first
two sources of influence are particularly troublesome, because their effects propagate at the speed
of light. Even a quite modest attempt at prediction—one hour into the future, for example—would
require the hapless clairvoyant to take account of a sphere with a radius of approximately
1,079,022,150 kilometres: this would include the Solar System as far out as Neptune.
Fortunately, most efforts at predictions do not require knowledge of the position of every particle:
higher-level abstractions suffice in many areas. Nevertheless, some real-world phenomena remain
intractable: meteorology and economics, for example.
6Normally we think of the history of a deterministic universe as being given by laws plus initial
conditions.  Laplace’s intelligence would have no difficulty in retrodicting as well as predicting
from any given point in time, however: “the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes”.
7Mention of the prediction of astronomical phenomena serves to remind us that one does not need
to know the actual laws which govern the circumstance in order to make accurate
prognostications. The South American civilisations were ignorant of modern considerations of
planetary motion, yet were able to make their predictions based on empirically based rules of
inference that served their purposes very well. Perhaps Tenochtitlán and Cøpenhagen are not so
far apart.
8conditions can result in completely different –typically, exponentially diverging–
states at a later time.  Even in a deterministic universe, with a one-to-one
correlation of initial conditions and resultant states, initial conditions must be
specified to an infinite degree of precision8.
The second difficulty is that quantum mechanics makes such specification
impossible. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle makes it clear that we are unable
to know with unlimited accuracy the position and momentum of any particle.
There is a minimum amount of indeterminacy which can never be eliminated
from measurements of any quantum system, and, in so far as such
indeterminacies may contribute to future states of any system, that system cannot
be accurately predicted.9
Of course, the impossibility of predicting the future does not mean that the future
of the universe is not determined. We should here distinguish between probability
and chance. If physical laws are determinate, we may assign a subjective
probability to our observing an  event,  based on our incomplete knowledge of
the system before us, knowing that if we were in possession of all  the facts, we
could make a completely accurate prediction. In this case, the future is
determinate (or, to put it another way, all particles have definite positions and
momenta); it is only our knowledge of the future which is hazy.
It may be, on the other hand, that even the possession of all the relevant facts
would make it impossible to predict the future, because there are some
(microphysical) interactions which are not subject to determinate laws - where an
event may or may not occur as a matter of chance. If there were such chance
phenomena, then we could not even in principle predict the future, because it is
indeterminate to the extent that some microphysical events are not
unambiguously determined by antecedent phenomena.
                                                
8If the universe exhibits a quantal character , then an infinite degree of precision will be
unnecessary, since below a certain threshold –that of the quantum-physical “grain”–, any further
specification will be unnecessary.
9There is the question of whether the measurements themselves give indeterminate results, or
whether they describe accurately an  indeterminate world. De Witt (see quotation below) thinks
the latter. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics disagree about whether the positions
and momenta of particles in question are (a) determinate, but impossible to calculate or measure
(indeterminable) or (b) actually indeterminate, and hence indeterminable. Locally-realistic and
hidden-variable theories take the former view. At the risk of sounding incoherent, it is probably
reasonable to say that Everett’s theory postulates real determinacy but actual indeterminacy.
9There are apparent instances of objective chance in physical phenomena. The
decay of a particular atom of a radioactive element, for example, seems to occur
at random, although the decay of many atoms is amenable to statistical analysis.
Quantum-mechanical formulae give probabilities for the outcomes of
measurements, probabilities which are indicative of genuine chance:
Quantum mechanics is a theory that attempts to describe in
mathematical language a world in which chance is not a measure of our
ignorance but is absolute.... precisely because quantum-mechanical
chance is not a measure of our ignorance, we ought not to tamper with
the state vector merely because we acquire new information as a result
of a measurement.10
If there are occasions where there is an objective chance (not merely a subjective
probability) that some event will or will not occur, then it follows that there will
be instances where the future state of the world will be indeterminate. In most
cases, this indeterminacy will not trouble us, because it only occurs at the
microphysical level: the macroscopic objects of our everyday experience are
composed of huge numbers of microphysical systems, and any indeterminacy is
in general statistically swamped.
There are some macrophysical systems, however, whose states are dependent
upon individual microphysical events, the most obvious being the measurement
apparatus of the physicist: cloud chambers, Geiger counters, photovoltaic cells
and the like all detect events which can be the result of quantum effects. Recent
advances in technology also provide ways for the microworld to affect the
macroworld. There are computer chips currently on the market which have
switches less that a micron across, using extremely small voltage differences to
represent information. Such systems are vulnerable to the effects of cosmic rays
and stray electrons: users are advised to re-install vital software periodically to
avoid corruption of data. A recently developed switch which uses a single atom
of xenon could conceivably be altered in its operation by quantum events.
One area of spacetime where quantum events have almost certainly given rise to
macroscopic effects was the very early universe. Fluctuations caused by quantum
events during the period of very high density postulated by big-bang theorists
would result in large-scale effects through the amplificatory effects of gravity.
                                                
10De Witt, 1970, p. 161. The remark about not tampering with the state vector is aimed at the
Copenhagen interpretation, which demands that the state vector collapses under measurement so
that only one measurement is obtained.
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Multiple probabilities, one result
The probability that a measurement on a quantum-mechanical system (say, a
particle) will return a given value is given by the wave-function11 y which
evolves continuously and deterministically according to the time-independent
Schrödinger equation.  The square of the absolute value of y (x,y,z) (or
“amplitude” at that point) gives the probability of measuring the presence of the
particle in the volume dxdydz at that point, with limits at zero (impossibility) and
one (certainty). Before the measurement is made, many points may have a non-
zero amplitude: there is a non-zero possibility that the particle will be found at
these points.
When a measurement is made the wave-function “collapses”: the probabilities for
all values save one collapse to zero, and one value acquires a probability of 1.
This eigenstate is that of the position of the particle as measured.  Before the
measurement, when multiple possible locations for the particle are given by the
wave function, the system in said to be in a superposition of states. The wave-
function is thought to fully describe the system at hand both before and after the
measurement is made.
Everett (1957, 1973) argues that the dual nature of the wave-function –continuous
and deterministic for an isolated system, but discontinuous and probabilistic for
an observed system– leads to inconsistencies if more than one observer is
postulated. He considers a system S, measured by an observer A.12 Before the
observation, S evolves deterministically. Upon observation, yS “collapses”
probabilistically, and a measurement is made, which A duly records in a
notebook. During all this, a second observer, B has been outside the room where
A’s experiments take place. B is in possession of the wave-function yA+S of the
entire room, including both the system measured by A and A himself, just prior to
A’s measurement.13 Because the system A+S  is isolated from B (he has not yet
performed a measurement upon it) he can deterministically compute the evolution
of the state-vector of the room for, say, one week into the future.  After a week, B
is still in possession of the wave function for the room. The wave-equation as
calculated by B contains non-zero amplitudes over at least two of A’s notebook
entries: otherwise, A’s measurement would have not been indeterminate.
                                                
11Also known as the state vector.
12Everett (1973), pp 4 - 9, Everett (1957), pp141-142
13In 1973 all quantum-physicists were by default male.
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B now opens the door and looks at A’s notebook. At this moment, the wave-
function calculated by B collapses probabilistically. Until that moment, however,
from B’s point of view, the wave-function had non-zero amplitudes over several
outcomes of A’s experiment; in other words, A was  mistaken in thinking that he
had made an objective measurement and was in fact in a superposition of states
for the last week!
In short, B implies that A owes his present objective existence to B’s
generous nature which compelled him to intervene on his behalf.
However, to B’s consternation, A does not react with anything like the
respect and gratitude he should exhibit towards B, and at the end of a
somewhat heated reply, in which A conveys in a colourful manner his
opinion of B and his beliefs, he rudely punctures B’s ego by observing
that if B’s view is correct, then he has no reason to feel complacent,
since the whole present situation may have no objective existence, but
may depend upon the future actions of yet another observer.14
Everett notes that this drama is “amusing, but highly hypothetical”. B would have
to be almost omniscient in order to know the full wave-function of an entire
room, and the prospect of calculating it forward for one week (with the
calculation itself presumably taking less than seven days to perform) beggars the
imagination. Nevertheless, it illustrates graphically the difficulty of reconciling
the dual aspect of the state vector.
 Everett considers six ways of avoiding the paradox, of which only the last two
are deemed viable:
(1) By denying the existence of more than one observer. The solipsist position is,
as always, unassailable but pointless, and unrewarding for the holder since
there is no one else to appreciate it.
(2) By denying the possibility of the possession of the wave-functions of
composite systems such as A+S on the grounds that quantum-mechanical
descriptions cannot apply to observers or measuring apparatuses, or
macroscopic objects themselves. This alternative fails on two grounds: (a)
there is the difficulty of defining a size above which a device is too big for
quantum-mechanical description, particularly since any large object (such as a
person) can be considered as a conglomeration of smaller entities (cells, for
example), which in turn are made of molecules, and so on; and (b) if it is only
                                                
14Everett (1973), pp 5-6
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human or animal observers which are excluded, there is the difficulty of
positing a relevant difference between them and mechanical devices which
perform the same function. Dualists will of course have an answer to this
difficulty.15
(3) By denying that B might be able to possess the state function yA+S because
such a determination would result in A’s ceasing to function as an observer.
One problem (apart from A’s insistence that he really is an observer, whatever
B thinks) is that it is not important for B to actually know the state function
yA+S, any more than it is necessary for A to know the state vector of system S
prior to measurement. If B believes that yA+S (whatever it is) is an accurate
description of the system, and that it evolves continuously and
deterministically prior to B’s measurement, (as A did in his similar situation)
then a conflict still arises with A’s apparently probabilistic observation. It is
any case hard to see how “being an observer” should make any difference to
how a thing behaves.
(4) By denying that the wave function is a complete representation of an isolated
system. The apparent discontinuity between the pre-observed evolution of the
state vector and the probabilistic outcome of the measurement could be due to
unknown factors which the original calculated wave function did not take into
account. Everett does not have an answer to this appealing alternative, except
to say that it lacks the simplicity of his own interpretation; later developments
however, such as Bell’s theorem, seem to have made it infeasible.16
(C) By denying that the wave-function actually describes the hypothetical
quantum system itself: rather it is a mathematical device whose only function
is to provide probabilities for measurements using classically described
apparatus. This is the “Copenhagen interpretation” due to Bohr: or more
exactly a non-interpretation, since it explicitly rules out the “possibility of a
                                                
15But would it be an answer? Presumably one would have to postulate an interactionist dualism,
since epiphenomenalism leaves the problem untouched. Yet an interactionist would have to
explain how the action of the soul frees the body from the rules of quantum physics. Mere
postulation of a spooky entelechy is hardly explanatorily satisfactory.
16In 1957, when Everett wrote his original paper, the question of locally realistic “hidden-
variable” theories was open. In 1964, however, John Bell produced his now-famous proof which
states that quantum mechanics predicts stronger correlations (between, say, EPR particle-pairs)
than can be accounted for by quasi-classical realistic theories. Bell’s results only preclude local
hidden-variables theories,and others, like Bohm’s non-local “pilot-wave” theory, are still viable.
Such theories violate the principle of local causation, however, and are for some unpalatable.
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conceptual model applicable to the quantum realm”17. Instead, the
interpretation divides the world into quantum-mechanical systems and
observer systems;  the latter are considered classically, and the former is
considered as statistical fictions only, useful for prediction but otherwise
devoid of meaning. Everett finds (as do I) that this prevailing interpretation is
unsatisfactory. Firstly, it is overly conservative; because it does not assign an
interpretation to the formalism, it lacks explanatory power. In essence, it
postulates the probability rules for quantum-mechanics as a phenomena-saving
artifice. Because it presupposes a classical realm, it is unable to provide an
explanation of that realm in terms of quantum-mechanical phenomena, which
is surely the whole point of the exercise.
(5) By abandoning the notion of the probabilistic “collapse of the wave-
function”, asserting that the deterministic wave-mechanical equations hold for
all systems, at all times. This is Everett’s position. As he says, it has “the
virtue of simplicity and it is complete in the sense that it is applicable to the
entire universe”18: that is, it does not depend on arbitrary restrictions as to its
validity (observers and measuring apparatus are treated in the same way as the
systems they observe), and no extra assumptions have to be made to free it
from paradoxes such as the one outlined above.
Everett’s many-worlds interpretation
Everett’s position can be stated quite simply. He assumes the validity of the
formalism of wave mechanics for all systems: the deterministic equations
accurately describe the evolution of the entire universe. The empirical results of
quantum-mechanical observations, with their discontinuous and probabilistic
nature, are re-interpreted in a novel fashion. Typically a state vector is given by
an equation which represents a superposition of possible measurement-results.19
Ordinarily, the state-vector is assumed to “collapse” under observation such that
one value is reified; the different values of the initial equation are considered as
giving probabilities (proportionate to the amplitude of the equation at that value)
that a particular measurement-result will eventuate.
                                                
17Everett (1973), 110. The Copenhagen interpretation is denoted “(C)” because Everett considers
it at a separate stage to the other five theories. Proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation will
of course insist that there is an interpretation, but I would contend that giving up the notion that
the formalism actually describes or models anything leaves us with syntax without semantics, a
mathematical trick, a sort of black box from which emerges the correct answers, but which might
as well contain Ptolemaic epicycles as anything else.
18Everett (1973), p.8.
19see eg. De Witt (1970), pp 157-160.
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Everett gives a more literal interpretation to the formalism, and asserts that each
of the superposed elements in the state-vector corresponds to a different state of
the observer.20 The state of the observer “branches” with each observation into a
superposition of states, one for each eigenstate of the original state-vector. Since
Everett does not privilege observer systems, the foregoing applies to all systems
in general and to all interactions governed by quantum mechanics. The universe
is constantly splitting into superpositions of states, including the observers of that
universe themselves!
“I still recall vividly the shock”, says De Witt21, “I experienced on first
encountering this multiworld concept. The idea of 10100+ slightly imperfect
copies of oneself all constantly splitting into further copies, which ultimately
become unrecognisable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense.”  Indeed,
there are those who seem unable to do so; both Penrose and Healey have
suggested that this is not what Everett intends, and give alternative explanations
of Everett’s work22. But Everett himself seems quite categorical:
From the viewpoint of the theory, all elements of a superposition (all
“branches”) are “actual,” none any more “real” than the rest. It is
unnecessary to suppose that all but one are somehow destroyed, since all
the separate elements of a superposition obey the wave equation with
complete indifference to the presence or absence (“actuality” or not) of
any other elements. This total lack of effect of one branch upon another
also implies that no observer will ever be aware of the “splitting”
process.23
According to the theory, the totality of the branching worlds, which I shall term
the “multiverse”, is at all times subject to, and evolves in accordance with, the
deterministic Schrödinger equations. From the point of view of the observers,
however, confined to their branches of the multiverse, the state vector appears to
                                                
20Everett (1957), pp 146-147.
21De Witt,(1970), p.161.
22Penrose (1979), p. 594; Healey (1989), pp 211-216. Penrose suggests that if Everett’s theory is
meant to replace conventional quantum-mechanical interpretations, then there should be
“backwards” branching as well as forward. But how do we know there are not such branches?
Healey states (correctly) that Everett’s theory postulates different observer states rather than
different observers. I do not know how one could tell the difference, if there is one, between one
world in several states and several worlds, each in one state. It is also unclear what one might
mean by one observer “simultaneously” being in several states; since a “state” is presumably a
complete configuration of the mass-energy which composes the observer, it would seem that a
more natural explanation would be that there are different (by Leibniz’ law) observers, each in
one state. On the other hand, see “To whom does ‘I’ refer”, below, for an exposition of just such a
situation.
23Everett (1957) Note to p. 146. Everett uses “real” and “actual” in a different sense from that
which I will use later in reference to indexicality.
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collapse. “We are then led to the novel situation in which the formal theory is
objectively continuous and causal, while subjectively discontinuous and
probabilistic.”24 The theory is entirely in accordance with experience, and one
must decide between Everett’s model and others on other than empirical grounds.
The difficulty that most people have when coming to terms with a many-worlds
metaphysics is that the simplicity of the theory is balanced by a tremendous
ontological cost: one must admit into one’s previously austere cosmos a very
large –perhaps infinite– number of universes, each as real as the one which we
experience. Indeed, Wheeler himself, Everett’s doctoral supervisor, is said to
have abandoned the many-worlds interpretation on the grounds that it carried
“too much metaphysical baggage”. The first task of the remainder of this thesis is
to examine that baggage and show that it is worth lugging around. I shall explore
some different metaphysical views of the universe and time which might be
contrasted with Everett’s interpretation, and show how the latter is of explanatory
utility in clearing up some difficulties to which the other theories are prone.
The second task will be to provide the theory with an adequate theory of personal
identity. There are two reasons for this. One is due to a rather misguided
comment from Penrose, referring to the Everett picture as a “‘zombie’ theory of
the world” populated (except for here) by unconscious automata, which suggests
that Penrose is either wilfully misunderstanding Everett or that he is a crypto-
dualist. The second reason is more serious. It will be clear that any statements
regarding a quantum system under the Everett interpretation will be assigned a
truth-value according to the observer who makes those statements: if I say
“system S is in state T”, then the truth of that statement depends quite literally on
who I am: for the statement to be true I must be on that “branch” where system S
did in fact attain state T. Since Everett’s interpretation applies to the entire
physical universe, it follows that any empirical propositions are, inter alia,
propositions about the position of the speaker within the “multiverse”. Contingent
truth25 is therefore an indexical notion: a proposition such as “ p is the case” must
be translated as “there is a world where p is the case, and this is that world”.
Since people appear to persist though time, there will be many, many branchings
of the universe to which any person belongs. An adequate theory of personal
identity must be able to account for the multiple branchings which will take
                                                
24Everett (1973), p.9
25Analytic or necessary truths will, in the standard modal manner, be true at all possible worlds,
and so contain no indexical information.
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place, particularly when dealing with statements in the past or future tense, when
it is not at all clear where one “world” ends and another begins. In parallel with
the concept of personal identity, a criterion of “world identity” will also be
provided.
Naive time
Let us characterise what I take to be the “naive” view of time. This is the view
that the present, a period of indeterminate and perhaps zero length in time during
which our immediate experience occurs, is in a constant state of movement (at the
rate, as it were, of one second per second) towards a future which is as yet
undefined. The past, having already happened, is fixed: there are facts-of-the-
matter which exist about the past, which do not yet exist about the future, but
which will exist when those as-yet-undetermined future moments become present
and then past. Thus while it a fact that I was born at a certain date, while I am still
alive there is no fact that pertains to the moment of my death. There will  be a
specific time at which I will die, however: the future, while it is future, may be
open, but as the present overtakes it –as potentialities are “actualised” or not– the
apparent possibilities of “what might happen” collapse into “what did happen”.
At time t0, a,b, and g
were  al l poss ibl e
futures: as the moving
" n o w"  a d v a n c e s ,
p ot e n t i a l i t i e s  a r e
actualized (or not), and
by time t4, a has
"panned out" as the
actual state of the
world.
Fig.1
"Now", at time t0
"Now", at time t4
t3
t4
t2
t1
t0
a
b
g
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The asymmetry between the past and the future –one is fixed, immutable, and the
other open, indeterminate– is either epistemological or ontological; either the
world just subjectively appears that way due to the limitations of our knowledge,
or there is some objective reason for it. The view described above suggests the
latter. The future really  is  open: perhaps because it “hasn’t happened yet” and
cannot therefore have any properties, or because there are yet-to-occur factors,
such as the free decisions by human agents, or chance occurrences, which the
present does not determine. In the diagram above, g might have occurred, but a
factor at t1 (such as a decision not to fight a certain sea-battle) caused a to occur
instead.
On the other hand, the apparent openness of the future might be simply because
we don’t know enough about the present to be able to know the future. It’s easy
to know what “happens” in the past: we remember seeing it, or we’ve heard about
it. Even if we don’t know anything else about the past, we know that it’s already
happened, so it won’t change on us. The future is another matter: we can
extrapolate somewhat, but there could always be factors about which we don’t
know. We don’t have be determinists to believe that the future is closed: it could
be, for example, that an omniscient God knows exactly what free choices each of
us will make in our lifetimes: to God, our future is just as real as our past. We
don’t even need to invoke a deity: the theory of timeless truth26 is enough. If
“there was a sea-fight today” is true, then surely yesterday’s prognostication
“there will be a sea fight tomorrow” was also true?27
Four-dimensionalism
If this is the case, then perhaps we shouldn’t talk about the present as if “when
now is” were ontologically decisive, since (at least as far as God is concerned),
all moments are “simultaneously” available. Perhaps the passage of time is an
artifact of our experience:
...we seem to think that we sit in a boat, and are carried down the stream
of time, and that on the banks there is a row of houses with numbers on
the doors. And we get out of the boat, and knock at the door of number
19, and, re-entering the boat, then suddenly find  ourselves opposite 20,
and having done the same, we go to 21. And all the while, the firm fixed
row of the past and future stretches in a block behind us and before us.28
                                                
26For a short exposition of timeless truth, see  the section on McCall’s “Temporal Flux”.
27This sentence is somewhat misleading. From the point of view of yesterday, (the opponents of
timeless truth would say), the protasis “there was a sea-fight today” is not yet assigned a truth-
value.
28Bradley, F. H. The Principles of Logic, Oxford, 1883, p. 54. Quoted by McCall (1966), p.270
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This, then, is the “block” universe. One can quite literally assume that time is a
fourth dimension in addition to the three spatial dimensions, and draw a
Minkowskian four-dimensional “map” of any system. Our experience of the
passage of time is analogous to spatial movement, albeit in one direction only,
and individuals are depicted as space-time “worms”, like the familiar time-lines
from history books.
One can distinguish two sorts of four-dimensionalism, based on differing
understandings of the role of the present within the block universe. In the first,
and the present moves, like the boat in Bradley’s somewhat Stygian metaphor,
borne ceaselessly into the future at a constant rate. 29 On this view, there is a fact
about when now is: future moments objectively acquire the quality of being the
present and later the past. The second view is I think the more usual and indeed
the more robust form of four-dimensionalism. That a moment is first future, later
present and then past30 is not so much because of an ontological spotlight of
presentness which moves over the block universe as a reflection of the temporal
location of the speaker. All moments in time are “the present” to themselves, just
as all spatial points are “here” from those points.
Normally, four-dimensionalism is accompanied by determinism: to draw a four-
dimensional space-time diagram, one merely extrapolates from an arbitrary time-
slice of the system in question, forwards or backwards, using determinate
physical laws. As mentioned above, however, one need not necessarily be a
determinist: a Laplacian intelligence could have, in addition to  full knowledge of
the mass-energy distribution of the system and its physical laws, a list of all the
exceptions to those laws (incidences of free-will, quantum indeterminacies, and
the like), when, where and with what effect they occur.31 In either case, the future
is unknown to us, but nevertheless it will occur, and it will occur in a certain way.
The difference between the future and the past is simple: we remember the past,
and we can only speculate more or less successfully about the future. There is,
however, no logical difference between the past and future: like left and right, the
                                                
29The time-dilation experienced by highly accelerated observers due to the theory of relativity
does not change the rate that the “present”, for that observer, moves: it only changes in relation to
an observer in a different inertial frame.
30There is of course the problem that this sort of explanation —” first future ... later past”—
seems to require a second-order temporality.
31This would in my opinion be tantamount to indeterministic fatalism, a metaphysically
provocative stance which would have it not only that the future is fixed, but that it is to a degree
independent of the state of the present.
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distinction is subjective only. The subjectivity of the distinction is guaranteed by
general relativity: observers in different inertial frames will report events at
different times, and what may be “future” for one observer is “past” for another.
McCall’s “Temporal Flux”
Four-dimensionalism, while in accord with our scientific world-view and
logically coherent, is to some unpalatable, probably because it conflicts with
some deeply held convictions about ourselves. We do not like to think that we are
helplessly propelled towards an inevitable future. Rather, we like to think that the
future will be as it will be as a result of our decisions32: we like to think that we
can steer our destiny towards our goals and away from our fears. Even if we don’t
believe in free will, the future seems indeterminate. Attempts have been made to
save these phenomena. One such attempt is due to  McCall (1966). He rejects the
four-dimensional “block” universe, reasserting an objective “now” and leaving
the future open. I examine McCall’s theory because it presents a plausible
alternative to the four-dimensionalists’ view which has some of the features of
subjunctive realism.
An aspect of four-dimensionalism is what McCall calls the theory of timeless
truth. As I write this sentence, I am wearing a hat. There is therefore a true
present-tense proposition “Michael is wearing a hat”: true, of course, because at
present Michael is in fact wearing a hat. This proposition is not very specific
about when Michael’s hat-wearing occurs, so perhaps it might be better to say
“Michael is wearing a hat at time t0”. Later, at time t1, we will be able to say
“Michael was wearing a hat at time t0”, and the truth-value will be unchanged.
Furthermore, if we are four-dimensionalists, it will be legitimate at time t -1 to
say “Michael will wear a hat at time t0”, again preserving the truth of the
statement, which is guaranteed by the fact that “Michael is wearing a hat at time
t0” is true at t0. Indeed for the sake of simplicity we might cover all three forms
by the “tenseless” locution (following the custom of italicising tenseless verbs
and copulae) “Michael wears  a hat at time t0”.
Of course, we are not normally in a position to make predictive statements about
the future with the desired degree of accuracy, but this inability (so the four-
dimensionalists say) is due to epistemic inadequacy rather than any deep logical
fact about the universe. The time of utterance of a tenseless proposition is
                                                
32Which, of course, it will: the fact that the future is determined would not make it any less true
that our decisions affect it.
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irrelevant in determining its truth-value: I do not now know whether the
statement “Michael dies on 25 August 2020” is true (and I hope that is not), but if
I am a four-dimensionalist, then the statement is as true (or false) now as it will
be in 2020, in the same way that “Mount Everest is over eight thousand metres
high” is true even if I’ve never been there.
McCall finds that this theory of timeless truth is in conflict with our normal ways
of speaking about the future. He has three objections. Firstly, when we make
guesses about the future, we are not inclined to think that our guesses (if correct)
were true from the moment that we made the guess: rather, they “turn out to be
true”, or even, that it turned out (when the guess was shown to be correct) that it
was true.  Secondly, McCall cites cases where we bring about future events. He
uses the example of a doctor, having given a patient a pill, says “There, now he’ll
get better”, which is translated as “it is now true to say that the patient will get
better” - now true, of course, because the curative pill has been administered: the
doctor is “bringing about the future” introducing a new factor, which is why he
says “There, now he’ll get better” after the pill has been given, and not before.
This, McCall says, “contradicts the timeless truth theory, since on that view if the
patient gets better, it would have been true to say that he would before the
administration of the pill.”33 Thirdly, McCall thinks that the theory of timeless
truth may be in conflict with the nature of the adjective “true”: rather than
inhering in a thing from beginning to end, like the sweetness and whiteness of
sugar, “ ‘[t]rue’ may be an adjective resembling ‘deceased’ or ‘extinct’ ”.34
With these difficulties in mind, McCall rejects the theory of timeless truth, and in
doing so rejects the Minkowskian block universe. McCall posits a new theory of
truth, which, like the theory of timeless truth, deals with tenseless dated
propositions of the form
(a) the space-time point (x,y,z,t0) is characterised by the property P
or
(b)the date of event E is t0.
 McCall distinguishes between the time of reference  of such statements and the
time of assertion.35 Obviously, when tenseless dated propositions are “translated”
                                                
33McCall (1966), p.274
34ibid. “True”, it seems to me, is neither like “sweetness”, nor “extinct”, since both of these
adjectives are descriptive of things, whereas “true” or “false” are only predicated of propositions.
The question then is whether propositions exist eternally.
35Respectively denoted here as tr and ta
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into the present tense, the two times will coincide ( ta  = tr): for future and past
tense sentences , ta <tr  and ta > tr  respectively. In the theory of timeless truth, the
time of assertion of a proposition is irrelevant to its truth-value. For McCall,
however, the time of assertion is vital to determining the truth or otherwise of any
statement. The conditions for the truth of a proposition are:
(i) Proposition p(t0)is true at assertion time t0 if p(t0)36
(ii)Proposition p(t0)  is true at t < t0 if there exists at t some condition
sufficient to make p(t0) true at t0
(iii) If proposition p(t0)  is true at t  then p(t0) is true at all subsequent
times
(iv) Under no other conditions (ie. unless its truth follows from (i)-(iii)
above) is p(t0) true.
In parallel with these conditions, there are conditions for falsehood, which are of
the same form with “false” substituted for “true” throughout (and a negation
symbol before the last occurrence of “p(t0)” in rule (i)). From these two sets of
rules it will be seen that there are future tense propositions (ie. those where ta <
tr) which are unburdened by either truth or falsity. These are those which fail to
fulfil criterion (ii): where there are at ta  insufficient conditions to make true (or
false) the proposition p(t0).
The theory therefore violates the principle of bivalence37 - that every proposition
is either true or false. Statements such as “Michael will become a member of the
Royal Society in 2028” are currently of indeterminate truth value (unless there
sufficient conditions now to guarantee their truth or otherwise). And this is what
constitutes the difference between the past and the future: simply put, future
statements are not subject to the law of bivalence, whereas those of the past (and
present) are, by virtue of rules (i) and (iii) and their falsehood-counterparts.
The metaphysical picture elicited is one where an indeterminate future is
continually being “reeled in”, subjected to the law of bivalence and assigned a
truth value. The past, equivalent to the set of true propositions about the world, is
similar to the Minkowskian block universe. The future is composed contains a
great number of maps, each one of which depicts a possible future. Any future
facts which by rule (ii) are already true will appear on every map: the other
                                                
36McCall, p. 276
37But not, as McCall is at pains to point out, the law of excluded middle.
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possibilia will be “fuzzy” due the “superposition of possible maps upon one
another”.38
First, it must be noted that if the universe is deterministic, then by rule (ii) the
picture will be almost identical to the four-dimensionalists’. The only difference
is that there is an “objective” present, and that true propositions about the future
are not subject the law of bivalence, despite fulfilling it.
An obvious objection, anticipated by McCall, is that general relativity requires
that observers in different inertial frames will order phenomena differently: their
“presents” do not coincide. Observer a, for example, might experience event a
before event b, while for observer b, the experience of  b precedes a . For
observer a  at t1, the proposition “a happens at t1” will be true, while “b happens
at t2” is still indeterminate. Observer b has the opposite experience. McCall is
quite happy to admit that different observers will see the truth differently. “Just as
in Einstein’s theory the results of measuring certain intervals of space and time
are relativised to the frame of reference or the observer, so in this theory the truth
or falsehood of certain propositions  is relativised to the time of their assertion.”39
Each observer must have their own “set of maps” of the future, according to the
propositions which are now true or merely possibly so for them.
Another potential difficulty is illustrated by the following. At t0, excluding prior
sufficient conditions, there is no fact-of-the-matter about a possible sea-battle at
t1: “there is a sea-battle at t1” is nether true nor false. If, at t1, the battle has not
eventuated, then it seems that one can say that at t0 the proposition “there is a sea-
                                                
38McCall, p. 280
39McCall, p.281. Earlier in his paper, McCall refers to “Absolute Becoming”: now, it seems,
things only Become Absolutely relatively.
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battle at t1” is false: after all, it is false at t1, and by t1, the possible “map”
featuring the sea-battle has been discarded.
Not so. The fact that t1 is sea-battle-less does not change the fact that at time t0,
there was  a possible future sea-battle. Rule (iii) states that the truth of a
proposition at time t ensures the truth of that proposition at subsequent times, but
explicitly (by rule (iv)), not vice versa. According to McCall, possibilia, not just
actualia, are facts about the world and should be temporally relativised. This is in
accordance with our normal way of thinking. As a child (assuming free will,
indeterminism, or what have you) I might have wished to become a fireman, and
there was no reason why it was impossible, so one could say, at t0: “Michael is a
fireman at t1”. This proposition , at t0, lacks a truth-value. At t1, having fallen
from the righteous path of firefighting and dabbled in the black arts of
philosophy, the proposition is false. On the strength of the proposition’s falsity at
t1, we do feel justified in claiming that it was false at t0, however. At the most,
we might say that, from the point of view of t1, the assertion at t0 was false. From
the point of view of t0, however, it is (was?) still indeterminate.
One’s acceptance of McCall’s theory depends on whether one is prepared to
countenance a “tensed” theory of truth. It certainly has some advantages: one is
freed from the usual fatalistic arguments, and the problem of future contingents,
normally the sticking-point between the human “naive” view and the four-
dimensional view from eternity, is resolved.
There are two main aspects of such a view which differentiate it from subjunctive
realism. The first is that McCall’s theory assigns a definite “now”, which moves
towards the future. The second is that it discounts “unactualised” possibilities as
inexistent. The subjunctive realist takes the idea of a “tree of possibility” quite
literally: unlike the naive position, however, other branches- past, future and
“contemporary”- are as real as the one on which the subjunctive realist lives.
They are, however, with the exception of those future branches which come off
the branch which constitutes “here”, inaccessible.
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Subjunctive realism
Subjunctive realism is so called because “unactualised” possibilities –“the way
things might have been”– are considered to be as real as the actualised
possibilities which we experience. In McCall’s metaphysics, future possibilities
are either fulfilled, in which case they become “real”, or they are not fulfilled,
and are discarded. In subjunctive realism, all possibilities are real: the possibility
which we observe is the one which we call “actual”. There is no “ontological
spotlight” on the actual world: in the manner of Lewis, actuality is defined as an
indexical term, like “here” or “yesterday”. A diagram analogous to those
provided for the four-dimensional and McCall worlds is shown below.
Every time an interaction occurs for which multiple results
are possible (where the wave-functions have non-zero
amplitudes over several results), the “multiverse” branches.
In the diagram on the left, only two branches are shown at
each juncture, but typically there will be many more. A
world can be defined as any path through the multiversal
tree; one can simply denote worlds by specifying beginning
and end points on a diagram such as the one above. (ab),
(ag) and (ad) are worlds.
In Figure 3, (ab), (a d) and (ae) share world-parts: the
worlds diverge when branchings occur. (ab) and (ae)
diverge later than (ab) and (ad): before then, they are identical, “sharing” the
world (ak). Indeed, before two worlds branch, they are the same world. The
identity of (partially) indiscernible worlds is not a view held by Lewis: I will
discuss my reasons for favouring “branching” over “divergence”  below.
One can consider the multiversal “tree” as a tree in phase space. Each point in the
phase space represents a state of the universe. The tree represents different
evolutionary paths through the space. In a deterministic world there would only
be one path through the space from a given point. If a Minkowskian deterministic
metaphysics is called “four-dimensionalism”, then subjunctive realism is “five-
dimensionalism”. Indeed, just as the other four dimensions admit of quantitative
comparisons (such as “a is to the left of b”, or “c is closer in time to d than f”), so
does the fifth: one can say that b and e are more closely related than d and g by
virtue of the fewer branchings between them on the tree of possibility. Similarly,
the location of junctures in the tree determines which points are “accessible” from
k
Fig. 3
a
b
g
d
e
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other points: b is accessible from a, but not from g, while from k one can access
d,b, and e but not g or a.
McCall’s tensed-truth world might depict the future in a similar way to that
above, with branches “dropping off” as they are reached by the Absolute
Becoming for a given observer and resembling the four-dimensionalists’ world:
hence the “acid-rain” version of subjunctive realism.
We may assign places to the various metaphysical positions in a table such as the
one below:
subjunctive realism
"naive view"
four-dimensionalism
Objective
Subjective
Non-indexical Indexical
What is actual?
W
he
n 
is 
no
w
?
subjunctive realism
(acid rain version)McCall's "Temporal Flux"
Fig. 4
The acid-rain version of subjunctive realism is shown tending towards a non-
indexical view of actuality, since the branches which have “dropped off” can
hardly be said to exist at all, much less have a claim to actuality. In full-blown
subjunctive realism, however, all branches and all points on those branches are
equally valid, equally existent. Obviously, we do not experience them all: our
own consciousness wends its way up the tree, and we only seem to experience
one path, or world, through the multiplicity of worlds that make up the
multiversal tree. That world, the one we experience, is the one we call “actual”.
Because there seems to be only one path down the tree, we feel comfortable
talking about an “actual”, immutable past, about which there are facts-of-the-
matter. Since we don’t know which branch of our future we will experience, or,
more exactly, since we don’t know which future individual we are identical with,
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we hesitate to call the future actual. This temporal asymmetry is discussed further
in “The open future”, below.
Nevertheless, we feel that there are logical, if not empirical truths about the
future. If p = “there will be a sea-battle tomorrow” then “p  ⁄ ~p” simply
describes the fact that all future branches from our vantage point contain either a
sea battle or a lack thereof.
How many worlds?
Since each branching occurs as a result of a quantum-mechanical interaction
which gives a number of possibilities, it is clear there will be very many such
junctures. Furthermore, since every branch will typically have many possible
outcomes, the multiversal tree will be huge to say the least. It is not necessary
that it be infinite, however. True, if the universe contains any degrees of freedom
which can be specified arbitrarily closely (and where it will make a difference if
they are) then there will be an infinite number of possible states of the matter
within that universe, but the very cause of the branching –quantum mechanics–
may preclude this.40
In the classical world, particles have energies and momenta which vary
continuously. The units of measurement are conventional: a particle may possess
such properties in an integral quantity or anywhere in between. The “quanta” to
which quantum theory refers are discrete units which represent the minima of any
changes to properties such as energy, spin, angular momentum and so on. As
such, properties like those described are quantized, and it follows that a list of
possible states which a particle may attain (assuming that those properties are not
themselves infinite) is limited. If all properties of particles were quantised, then
the possible combinations of those particles –and hence of macroscopic
phenomena, made up of combinations of integral quantities of particles– would
also be only finite in number.
There are some properties, however, particularly extrinsic, relational properties,
which appear to be continuously variable. The spatio-temporal position which a
particle occupies relative to another particle, for example, or its velocity, are not
                                                
40These considerations may seem unimportant since it’s going to be a very large number in any
case, and certainly greater than the number of particles in the observable universe (approximately
1087 at the last count). Yet if the total number of possible outcomes of a particular branch is
infinite, then the probability of any individual (finite) outcome is zero!
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quantized41. An attometre here or there can make a difference in, say, two atoms
coupling in a chemical bond, or a free neutron impacting on a uranium nucleus in
a chain reaction. Surely, if position and velocity are continuously variable, there
are an infinite number of possible particle interactions, irrespective of any other,
quantized properties which those particles possess?
On the other hand, it is not clear that we should, or even meaningfully can, make
distinctions between systems which are arbitrarily and indetectably alike. There
may be cases where we can conceive of differences between two systems which
are nonetheless indistinguishable because the two systems are even in principle
experimentally and hence causally identical. Suppose we have a magical
machine42 which can vary the position of a target particle continuously. We
bounce other particles off it,  note the diffraction as they impact on a screen, and
thereby establish its location. As we twiddle the knob on the target-moving
machine, the diffraction pattern changes, and by noting the movements of the
diffraction pattern on the screen, we deduce the movements of the target. Since
our machine can vary the position of the target continuously, we can twiddle the
knob as small an amount as we like, and the movements of the diffraction
patterns will be corresponding less pronounced. Eventually, we will move the
knob small enough that we cannot detect any difference in the diffracted
particles: perhaps the movements on the screen are smaller than the wavelengths
of visible light, so, rather than simply looking at the screen, we switch to
ultraviolet, then to x-rays and gamma rays: still we may twiddle the knob an ever-
smaller amount, requiring ever-smaller wavelengths, themselves requiring ever-
greater amounts of energy for their production. Eventually there will be an
insufficient amount of energy in the universe to make particles of sufficient
energy (or, if you like, waves of sufficiently high frequency) capable of resolving
the difference in diffraction patterns. This is quite apart from the insuperable
difficulties in observation (due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) caused by
using such high-energy particles.
If there is a level below which differences between systems are causally
insignificant, then there are only a finite number of non-trivially distinguishable
                                                
41I am here speaking of distances between particles which do not form part of the same atom or
molecule: the distance between (say) two nuclei in a hydrogen gas might vary continuously until
they approach each other closely.
42Magical, of course, because the precise specification of position and momentum of a particle is
precluded by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
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worlds composed of different arrangements of a finite amount of mass-energy43.
In other words, there are only so many meaningfully different positions in phase-
space. I have described the multiversal tree of Figure 3 as a tree of paths through
phase space: although there might be an infinite number of theoretically distinct
branches on the tree, the “scale of resolution” of causal differences makes them
indistinguishable.44
A higher threshold of indistinguishability, that of the limits of human perception,
will be discussed later in the section “Living in Multiple Worlds”.
When do worlds diverge?
Since the effects of any event cannot propagate faster than light, it follows that
two worlds which are distinguished by that event may not diverge before the
relevant parts of the world enter the event’s future light-cone. Suppose that a
quantum-mechanical event in World X might eventuate in a star going nova45.
 The hypothetical inhabitants of a planet orbiting at ten light-minutes distance
from the star cannot be said, at the instant when the event does (or doesn’t)
                                                
43Obviously, an universe of infinite size has an infinite number of combinations: our universe
does not appear to be infinite however.
44cf. Born (1954), p.377: “According to the heuristic principle used by Einstein in the theory of
relativity, and by Heisenberg in the quantum theory, concepts which corrrespond to no
conceivable observation should be eliminated from physics.”
45An unstable star might be “set off” by a massive nuclear bomb (or group thereof) triggered by a
Schrödinger-type cat-killing device.
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happen, to be inhabiting either the “fried” world (World A) or the “safe” one
(World B). It is not until the planet enters the future light cone of the event ten
minutes later that the worlds diverge for that planet.46
This is not mere conceptual economy (since one is postulating billions of worlds,
one might as well economise somewhere); the fact that World X is “parent” of
two separate worlds does not make it necessary to assume that there are two
“World X’s”, any more than it is necessary to distinguish the father of Laertes
from that of Ophelia. Those parts of World X which are as yet untouched by the
consequences of the event at t0 cannot be considered as part of either World A or
World B, even though every part of World X which lies within the future light-
cone of the event will eventually become part of World A or World B.
Such considerations give credence to McCall’s temporal theory of truth. The
question is whether the X’s in the worlds (XA) and (XB) are identical. For the
two world-segments to be identical –for there to be one, not two, segments– they
must be indiscernible: nothing can be predicable of one that is not also predicable
of the other. If truth were timeless, then we could at time t0 (or at any time
previous to that) distinguish two planets: one where “The wavefront of the sun’s
explosion will reach us in ten minutes” is true at t0 (the planet which will be part
of World A) and one where it is false (the planet which will be part of World B).
If we adopt McCall’s theory, on the other hand, and modify it according to the
relativistic concerns given above, then the proposition is neither true nor false
until t10 minutes, when the worlds diverge. The truth of the proposition “the sun
explodes at t0” is equivalent, and is similarly undetermined until t10, when that
part of the universe “finds out” whether it is true or not.
One might object that McCall’s original formulation of the truth-conditions for a
proposition are adequate, in particular rule (ii), since at t0 there are sufficient
conditions for the truth (or falsity) of the proposition “The wavefront of the sun’s
explosion will reach us in ten minutes”: the condition in question is the fact that
the sun has exploded (or not). Rule (ii) simply states that “Proposition p(t0)  is
true at t < t0 if there exists at t some condition sufficient to make p(t0) true at t0”
but is not clear in which sense the sufficient condition is supposed to exist. I
would contend that we cannot meaningfully say that a condition is in existence
now when there is no possible way, even in principle, for us to know whether that
                                                
46Penrose(1979) provides a diagram of this relativistic world-splitting, where “world-sheets”
diverge along light-cones, described elsewhere as the “baklava-world”.
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condition obtains. We will know at t10 whether the condition did obtain at a
distant location at t0, but in the relativistic world, spatial and temporal distance
are equivalent in that they both preclude causal interactions where cause and
effect do not lie respectively within each other’s future and past light cones.
We should therefore introduce a modification to McCall’s first two truth-
conditions, requiring that the truth of a given proposition be established, in
addition to the time of assertion, at the place of assertion as well:
(i) Proposition p(t0) is true at assertion space-time t0,x,y,z if p(t0,x,y,z)
(ii)Proposition p(t0)  is true at t < t0 if there exists at t,x,y,z some
condition sufficient to make p(t0) true at t0,x,y,z
These conditions (along with the appropriate parallel rules for falsity) allow us to
assert the identity of world-segments which predate branchings.
Rehabilitating timeless truth
From the point of view of any one of the branches, then, McCall’s (relativistically
modified) theory of temporal truth applies: a proposition is not assigned a truth-
value until its time of reference is “appreciated”. From the extra-worldly point of
view, however,  looking at the multiversal “tree” in its entirety, there is no sense
of events unfolding, of propositions becoming true or proved false, of
possibilities being actualised. The view from eternity is unchanging. Unlike the
standard four-dimensional or block universe, however, the “five-dimensional”
multiverse of subjunctive realism does not allow of determinate answers to
empirical questions, when asked of the multiverse as a whole. The reasons for
this are obvious: any situation which is not either nomologically unrealisable or
logically impossible will be instantiated somewhere –very probably, many times–
on the multiversal tree. The truth-value of an empirical proposition, while
timeless, must be relativised to the branch of the multiverse about which it is
made.
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The diagram on the right shows world (ad)
branching at time t1 in two worlds, (ab)
and (ag). The first branch-world (ab)
contains a sea-battle at time t2, while the
other does not. The timeless proposition
“there is a sea-battle at time t2” has three
possible truth-values, depending on where
and when it is asserted. As asserted by an
inhabitant of world (ab), it is true, by an
inhabitant of (ag), false, and at world (ad)
(and hence before time t1) it is
indeterminate. In each case, the propositions possess their truth-values timelessly:
because a world can be considered a path through phase-space, and hence as a
group of successive arrangements of mass-energy, it follows that the definition of
any world will include (among other things) the very fact to which the
proposition in question refers. In other words, the proposition “the proposition
‘there is a sea-battle at t2’ is true at world (ab)” is true.47
What about the other worlds?
A natural interpretation of the branching which accounts for the indeterminacy of
future propositions is to think of each of the branches as a possibility which may
or may not be “actualised”. McCall’s metaphysical picture (Fig.2) is an
illustration of this, and may be considered as a person’s-eye view of a single
world. From the point of view of that particular world, past possibilities are no
longer actualisable, and are inaccessible. They are not actual, unlike the world of
our experience. Future possibilities may or may not become actual; in other
words, they will become part of our world (or not).
The assertion that only one of the many possible worlds is actual seems to
conflict with the original reasons for postulating the different possibilities in the
first place. Everett’s formulation of the laws of quantum mechanics allows for
many different states of a given system, none of which has any greater claim to
the “ontological spotlight” than any other. The solution to this conflict, as
indicated, is to treat actuality as an indexical term. Every world is actual, but only
at that world: such a proposition is not different in form to “every place is ‘here’,
                                                
47It might be objected that this is tautological, since the fact that world ( ab) is (ab) and not some
other world is due to the fact that (ab) is the world where the sea-battle (among other things)
occurs. This is, I think, quite true but not undesirable.
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but only at that place”. All nomologically possible worlds are real, however: none
of the branches on the multiversal tree are imaginary, and furthermore, every
place that there could be a branch, there is one.
Some may cavil at the distinction between “actual” and “real”; those who believe
in only one world will conflate the two. The distinction can be reaffirmed in
modal terms: those things which are “real” (in the sense I give)  are possible, and
those which are unreal are not. Actuality is merely instantiated possibility. Thus
horses are actual (and a fortiori real), unicorns are not actual, yet real —at least in
this world— and square circles are neither actual nor real: they do not exist in any
logically possible world.
Lewis’ modal realism
Having said that there is a branch everywhere where there could be one, it still
remains to be seen where those branches might sprout. Let us consider the two
extremes. The first is that there are no places where branches could sprout at all.
If the cosmos is deterministic, then there are no occasions where there are
chances for the world to turn out one way or the other. Rather than a multiversal
tree we have a universal stick. Of course, there is no reason why some branches
of the multiverse might lack subsequent branches. If the laws of physics were not
“multiversally immutable” –if, for example, they came into being at some very
early stage of a big-bang type universe– then there is no reason not to suppose
that there are worlds where the laws of physics are deterministic; perhaps even
this world. At the other extreme, we have David Lewis’ modal realism, where
“absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world
is.”48 There is, on Lewis’ view, (at least) one world for every logically possible
arrangement of world-stuff.
In the case of subjunctive realism, there are worlds for every nomologically
possible arrangement of world-stuff: the possibilities are subject to the laws of
nature as well as the laws of logic. I think that it is safe to say that the set of
nomologically possible worlds is a possibly maximal subset of that of the
logically possible worlds. I do not know whether the laws of nature are more
restrictive than those of logic. If the laws of nature were deterministic, for
example, then the set of nomologically permissible circumstances following from
any given initial conditions would be a very small subset of the logically
                                                
48Lewis (1986), p.2.
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permissible configurations: given that the motivation for the theory of subjunctive
realism lies in explaining the many possible outcomes of empirical experiments
of quantum-mechanical systems, it may be that the laws of nature are more
permissive than we might otherwise think. While for most quantum-mechanical
systems there will be one highly probable result, other results are allowed: the
wave function has non-zero amplitudes over many values with lower
probabilities.
Weird worlds
There are, for example, logical possibilities which would not be thought
instantiable by the laws of nature as we know them. I do not think it is logically
impossible that I might wake up one morning and find that the world was
otherwise normal except that the sky was bright green, but I should be extremely
surprised, since there are good reasons for them to be the colours that they
normally are, reasons which are given by the laws of physics. If the sky were
green, it might imply that the composition of the atmosphere had changed, and
there would be causes for, and effects of, this occurrence, yet ex hypothesi , the
world is otherwise normal. Such a situation would be extremely hard to reconcile
with the laws of physics, yet it is perhaps not impossible.
The equations which cover the states of quantum systems will typically give a
most probable result along with several other possible results with very low
amplitudes. According to Everett’s theory, each of the other possibilities is
realised as a branching world. It is not inconceivable that the positions of the
subatomic particles in a molecule might be repositioned so as to transmute its
constituent atoms and thereby change it from one sort of molecule to another. To
effect a change over the whole atmosphere, billions of such improbabilities would
have to be compounded. Furthermore, some sort of suspension of normal
causation would have to occur such that the inhabitants of Earth do not choke on
poisonous chlorine fumes: perhaps there is an equally fortuitous re-arrangement
of the green gas into regular air at their nostrils. Nevertheless, such a fantastically
improbable circumstance is not absolutely impossible, and we should therefore
assume that the Everett’s interpretation allows for it and assigns it a place in the
world-tree. Ours  is not like that, though. Why are we in a world where
fantastically unlikely things do not happen?
For every world where the whole sky suddenly turns green, there are untold
trillions where nothing so interesting happens. As noted above, quantum
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phenomena are for the most part inconsequential on the large scale because of the
sheer number of microphysical systems involved. Where macrophysical events
are stochastic in nature because part of the causal process involves quantum
indeterminacy (radioactive decay, for example) the indeterminacies are normally
only part of an otherwise deterministic chain of events.  A situation similar to the
one described above is many orders of magnitude less likely to occur.
De Witt considers the problem of what he calls “maverick worlds”, and suggest
two possible solutions. The first is a version of the “weak anthropic principle”, to
the effect that the reason that the world is not full of fantastically improbable
events is that if it were, we would not be around to see them:
If the initial conditions were right, the universe-as-we-see-it could be a
place in which heat sometimes flows form cold bodies to hot. We can
perhaps argue that in those branches where the universe makes a habit of
misbehaving in this way, life fails to evolve; so no intelligent automata
are around to be amazed by it.49
I think that this argument might suffice for the elimination of maverick worlds
where the hypothetical improbability invokes systemic situations which would
make it unlikely that life forms like ourselves could evolve (although perhaps
other life-forms which were not troubled by thermodynamic inconstancy might,
who, having evolved in such a universe, would not be surprised by it at all), but it
does not explain why strange thing do not happen now, nor does it do away with
non-lethal improbabilities.
De Witt’s second suggestion is that such worlds simply do not appear in the
multiverse, perhaps because “it may not have enough fine structure to
accommodate [them]”50. As discussed above, a finite universe can have only a
finite number of branches in its wave-function: De Witt points out that maverick
worlds would occupy a vanishingly small proportion of the total superposition.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see why those maverick worlds, unlikely as they are,
should be excluded from the multiverse. I think that the answer to the problem is
statistical, and that the reason that this world is a “non-maverick” and some other
world isn’t is the same reason that the I am not the winner of the state lottery,
when somebody else is. Maverick worlds are much, much more rare than non-
                                                
49De Witt (1970), p.163.
50ibid.
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maverick ones. If the probability of one molecule “changing green” is 1 p  , then
for n molecules in the atmosphere, the probability is  1 np . If the chances of one
molecule changing are infinitesimal, then the probability of the whole atmosphere
changing is many of orders of magnitude less likely. For every world where the
whole atmosphere (n molecules) has changed, there are p worlds where n-1
molecules have changed and in turn there are p worlds for each of those worlds
where n-2 molecules have changed....  One is simply much, much more likely to
find oneself in a one of the less bizarre worlds.
Furthermore, we privilege some states as being more unlikely then others. We
deem the current state of the world as “likely” simply because (for us) it has been
instantiated, whereas in fact it is no doubt true that many unlikely events have
conspired to make the world as we see it. Every hand of cards is equally unlikely:
it’s just that we lump together all those hands where nothing special (by our own
arbitrary criteria) occurs. One world is a laughably small sample from which to
base our conclusions. Even if this world, where life has evolved the way it has on
the planet that it has, where this person is writing this paper at this precise time,
even if this world were the least likely of all possible worlds, then we, having
evolved our sciences and notions of probability in this world, would not see it as
unusual. The “interestingness” of a state of affairs is in inverse proportion to the
likelihood of its occurrence: we are twice as likely to see something half as
interesting happen. The most likely outcomes, therefore, are those which are the
least interesting, if only because we, having lived in a world where such things
happen constantly, have become blasé about them.
The way things might be
It may be that the number of nomologically possible worlds is in fact the same as
that of the logically possible ones. None of this, however, should lead us to
imagine that it is possible to map the worlds of subjunctive realism onto the
Lewis-worlds. Lewis explicitly denies branching of worlds, favouring what he
calls “divergence”: any spatiotemporally related systems are, according to Lewis,
worldmates, so the branching multiverse described above, which includes a sort
of spatiotemporal relation between what I call worlds, would presumably be
considered by Lewis as a single world with intra-worldly branching between
quasi-separate world-like systems within that world51. I do not think that such an
                                                
51See e.g. Lewis (1986), pp.69-81
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analysis is a bad one, and I would agree that if Lewis’ theory were correct that the
subjunctive-realist’s “multiverse” would be but one world among the vast
plethora of other possible worlds.
The difference between my position and Lewis’ on the number of worlds that
there are, and how they are connected, is due to the origin of our theories in,
respectively, the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the
possible worlds interpretation of modal logic. Both subjunctive and modal
realism are the result of taking their “parent” theories seriously. In the case of
modal logic, a possible world may be considered as a maximal set of consistent
propositions of the right sort: the generation of such sets is a combinatorial
exercise where each set is not related to any other except in that they may share
some (non-numerically) identical members. A possible world according to
subjunctive realism, on the other hand, is a chain of world-states linked by causal
relations such that each world-state is preceded by and itself precedes one other:
the generation of such worlds may involve situations where different world-states
are possible results of the state preceding it, in which case a new chain of events,
and hence a new world, is formed.
Personal Identity
Every way that a world might be, some world is.52 Any assertoric proposition
which is not necessarily either true or false —and hence true or false at all
possible worlds— will be true in at least one possible world (and false in at least
one too). The first conjunct, therefore, of the explicit rendering of synthetic
propositions such as “x is the case” —“there is at least one world where x is the
case, and this is one such world”— becomes unnecessary, leaving a locution of
the type “this is a world where x is the case” as the bearer of meaning. It is
immediately apparent that the truth-value of such locutions is dependent upon
that to which “this” refers: in other words, they are indexical propositions whose
truth or falsity is dependent of the location of the speaker within the multiverse.
This would not be a problem if persons —all things considered, the most likely
candidates for speakers of propositions— were momentary entities. In this case, it
                                                
52This is true whether you are a modal or a subjunctive realist; the only difference is in the way
that you think that a world might be. Modal realists will think that any logically possible world is
a way that a world might be, whereas a subjunctive realism thinks that only nomologically
possible worlds might exist.
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would be easy to determine which world the speaker was in. But persons persist
through time, and if something is to persist for more than a very short period of
time indeed, that something will be witness to (and part of) many world-
branchings. This problem is only exacerbated when propositions regarding the
past and future are concerned.
Two of the basic tenets of Everett’s theory are that it does not privilege observer-
systems, treating them like any other quantum system, and that it observes the
principle of psycho-physical parallelism (that is, it is materialist with regard to
the mind-body question).These two considerations lie at the heart of Everett’s
rejection of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and they make
it clear that persons, in so far as they are physical objects, will be subject to the
same laws as any other physical object.
As previously described, when a measurement-like event occurs for which
multiple possibilities exist, the system at hand (ultimately, the entire universe
containing the particle/s in question) will “branch”, with a branch for each of the
superposed solutions to the function describing the evolution of the state-vector.
The wavefront of this branching advances at the speed of light, cleaving the
world as it goes. As a part of the branching system, our persons will branch along
with the rest of the universe. The branching occurs many, many times per second:
we would seem to be proliferating through the multiverse at an alarming rate.
Furthermore, unless consciousness “resides” at some point within the skull, it is
not possible to give a definite time to the instant when the person-branching takes
place. A theory of personal identity is required which can cope with this
branching: to begin, however, we may consider the case in the more familiar
four-dimensional non-branching universe.
The spatiotemporal boundaries of any object, including those of persons, are to an
extent arbitrary. It is convenient for everyday purposes to assume that one is
bounded in time by birth (or conception) and death, and in space by the outer
membrane: it is obvious, however, that our perception of these boundaries is
strongly conditioned by our sensory apparatus and our anthropocentric view of
the world. If, instead of a macroscopic humans’-eye view, we were to approach
our bodies with the (admittedly reductive) view of the quantum physicist, then
the boundaries would appear much fuzzier. Rather than a single brown-beige-
pink four-dimensional spacetime “worm”, at the microscopic level our bodies are
“braids” of smaller worms: some worms (such as those making up the cells of the
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brain) stay with the group for a long time: others weave their way in and others
out of the main braid quickly as the result of ingestion and excretion. In the
macro-worms of living beings, the interchange of micro-worms is faster and more
varied than for inanimate matter, but even in rocks and the like, processes such as
oxidisation and erosion involve an interplay of space-time micro-worms53.
Indeed, it is not impossible to conceive of the entire universe as a gigantic four-
dimensional Gordian knot of micro-worms representing subatomic particles and
waves, interacting according to the laws of physics.54
The first casualty of such a world view is the notion of identity over time.
Something can only be strictly identical with itself, and even self-identity in an
otherwise unchanging object cannot be maintained over time if external relations
(dyadic or higher) count as predicable qualities contributing to identity, since
relations with other objects will change in a changing world. It is obvious that as
a bundle of micro-worms I am not strictly the same person that I was ten minutes
or even less ten years ago. There are differences between myself at present and
myself in the past and the future. Given the transitivity of identity, it follows that
if Michaelt1 is identical with Michael and Michaelt2 is also identical with
Michael, then Michaelt1 is identical with Michaelt2, which is patently false.55 In
the presumed absence of a non-material soul or some other enduring feature56,
identity over time must be discarded.
                                                
53In keeping with Everett’s concerns described above it is desirable that the theory be applicable
not only to people but to objects in general; it should be noted, however, that there are significant
differences between people and rocks: if one is a functionalist, for example, one would think that
a person is multiply realisable in a way that a rock is not. The functions in a person’s brain might
be realised by other sorts of worm-groups —say, by a computer program— whereas a rock must
have at least the same sort or worms comprising it. (In defence of the rock: one could argue that
the emergent characteristic like consciousness in humans which are realisible in other ways are
equivalent to emergent rock-functions like paperweight-ness which are also realisable by other
worm-configurations.)
54In keeping with quantum theory, there may be some dinscontinuities in the micro-worms, or (as
long as we are still thinking of four-dimensional Minkowski space rather than five-dimensional
subjunctive-realism space) some fuzziness as to their locations.
55One could say that Michael is constituted by a certain (changeable) physical thing p 1 at t1, by
p2 at t2 and so on, in which case Michaeltn for any n would be identical with any other Michaeltn
by virtue of being constituted at t1 by p1, at t1 by p2...  What would it mean, though, for
Michaeltn to be constituted by pn* where n  ≠ n* i.e., where a time-indexed individual is
constituted (and, in any case, this relation of constitution is not one of identity) by something at
another time? Surely it is preferable that there is a four-dimensional Michael whose timeslices
(Michaeltn) are identical with physical states pn for each n.
56One often hears that one’s cells are replaced every few years: the exception to this gradual
renewal is in the brain, the cells of which begin to die off following adolescence. As such, we
may consider our personhood as contingently dependent on the possession of certain brain cells.
Even so, the cells of the brain are not in themselves identical over time; they, as much as anything
alse, are braids of micro-worms too.
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The most satisfactory solution is to divide the four-dimensional worm-world into
arbitrarily thin three-dimensional time-slices; objects57 which persist through
time are composed of many such time-slices; segmented worms with temporal
parts. A four-dimensional object (remembering that what counts as an object in to
an extent arbitrary) is self-identical, but there is no more reason for different
temporal slices to be identical than for, say, horizontal slices of a three-
dimensional object.
Having said that, it is clear that in a four-dimensional object, each part is similar,
but not identical to, its temporal neighbours. “Identity” over time is then the sum
of many relations of similarity. Similarity is what one might call weakly
transitive: if for object O, Ot1 is similar to Ot2 and Ot2 is similar to Ot3 then Ot1 is
(weakly) similar to Ot3.58 As the chain of similarity gets longer, the weaker the
similarity becomes. This accords with our normal understanding of objects
changing through time: we are more alike our temporally close selves than those
of our distant past or future.
When we choose to pick out a bundle of micro-worms and distinguish them as an
object which exists through time, we do so by virtue of the worm-bundle
possessing certain properties: or more precisely, by virtue of each of the temporal
parts of the object possessing those properties. The temporal parts of a cube are
themselves cube-shaped; if at some (temporal) stage of the four-dimensional
cube-worm the temporal parts are no longer cubical, the object is no longer a
cube. Of course, all of this is highly dependent on the properties which we do and
do not consider it important for an object to have. These properties, and the extent
to which we allow these properties to change, differ from object to object. In
general, increasing complexity in an object is accompanied by a greater
willingness on our part to accommodate changes in its material composition. We
routinely assert the “identity” of living beings through time, despite those beings
undergoing profound changes in size, shape, abilities and (if sapient), their
personalities.
                                                
57Given what has just been said about the arbitrariness of objects, it should be pointed out that
“object” here can mean literally any physical thing whatsoever, including groups of things; the
entire universe, for example, is a object with temporal parts.
58Assuming, of course, that the similarities in question are of the same sort. A green square is
similar to red square, and a red square is similar to a red circle, but a green square is not similar to
a red circle: in the first case, the similarity is based of squareness, the second, on redness.
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The last twenty-five years or so has seen a wealth of literature by Anglo-
American philosophers —Parfit, Nagel, Wiggins, Lewis, Perry, Shoemaker, and
the like— appear on personal identity, dealing with the criteria by which we
establish identity and the reasons for asserting or denying the continuation of that
identity through time. These explorations have been conducted via thought
experiments using outlandish scenarios like personality bifurcation, split-brain
experiments, teleportation, gradual or sudden body-part (or brain-part)
replacement, and so on. This is not the place for an examination of the literature,
nor do I presume to be able to fit all of the theories into one grand scheme.
Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that there are two main camps regarding the
minimal criteria for continuance of personal identity59– for being able to say “ this
individual60 is the same person as that individual”. The two criteria I have in
mind are (1) causal connection, and (2) psychological continuity. Naturally, the
camps are not neatly divided: most philosophers, while claiming that one of these
criteria is most important, admit the importance of the other.
(1) Causal connection: This criterion is basic to our understanding of objects in
general, and not just to persons. Adjacent portions of space-time are found to
causally connected (and are the only portions to be so).  When we note similarity-
relations between adjacent time-slices of four-dimensional objects, we are also
noting causal connections between those slices. Where objects undergo changes,
we require evidence of (or, failing that, postulate) a causal link between the
differing states of the object. Thus if we are asked to assert a relation, say,
between objects A (a red cube) and B (a blue sphere) such that they are “the same
piece of wood”, we should expect there to be a causal story (presumably
involving woodworking tools and paint) that explains the difference. Because
persons undergo physical changes during their lives, it is necessary that there be a
causal history connecting candidates for “same-personhood”.
(2) Psychological continuity: One of the most salient features of our
consciousness involves our ability to remember past events (and to remember
them happening to us) and to plan for future ones. Anticipation, regret, hope and
fear all require a continuity of psychological events. Normally, psychological
                                                
59Putting “personal identity” into scare-quotes should be otiose considering the above discussion
on similarity. It shall henceforth be used loosely to describe whatever it is that makes us think that
we are the same person (whatever that means) as we were yesterday.
60In the discussion to follow, individuals are limited spatially, temporally and to their own world:
they are temporal, spatial and worldly parts of the multiversal tree. Persons (and temporally
extended objects in general) are made up of  groups of such individuals.
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continuity is paralleled by physical continuity (and hence by strong causal
connection) but thought-experiments confirm the paramount importance of
psychological continuity: if Alice and Bob were to go to bed, and upon waking
the physically female individual possessed the memories, traits, knowledge,
aspirations, character, and the belief that “she” was in fact Bob, and vice versa,
then we should conclude that Alice and Bob had somehow swapped bodies, and
not that Alice and Bob had lost their own  personalities and gained new ones. The
only remotely likely way, according to current scientific knowledge, that such an
occurrence could eventuate is if Alice and Bob had their brains swapped: yet if
(impossibly) upon examination their whole bodies, including the brains, were
found to be identical, we should not feel within our rights to tell the physically
male individual that they were mistaken in thinking that they were Alice with a
new body. These considerations indicate that personhood is only contingently
instantiated in this-or-that neural configuration: if another configuration could do
the job, or if some other physical substrate (a computer, for example) might
support the same mental events, then we would allow that that substrate
instantiated the same personhood as before.
While these criteria are exhibited by the objects of our everyday experience
(ourselves and, we presume, other humans), I submit that the second criterion is
of more importance than the first: even if there were no plausible causal
connection between two physical individuals who nonetheless displayed a
psychological continuity we should have to treat them as instances of the same
person. If a person were to die or disappear, and if some time later an individual
were to appear who claimed to be that person, possessing all the psychological
characteristics, memories, etc. of the original individual, we should have to admit
the identity of the person first and search for a causal explanation second.† Nor
must the continuity in question involve the retention, from beginning to end of
the person’s existence, of all, or even any, of the personality61 of the person
involved. Lewis’ Methuselah62 lives so long that his aspirations, desires and so
on at the end of his life are nothing like those that he had as a young man. He
cannot even remember being five hundred and twenty-five years old, much less
twenty-five. Indeed, his personality changes several times during his life (137
years being, for some reason, the maximum time that a personality trait can last)
and Methuselah as a young man is apparently not the same person as he is on his
                                                
† A major religious figure of some two millennia past comes to mind.
61This quite appropriate term shall henceforth be used to refer to one’s psychological attributes:
hopes, fears, loves, wants, tastes and so on.
62Lewis (1976), pp.29-31
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deathbed. Not so. What counts is not that Methuselah-25 and Methuselah-969
have (almost) the same personality, but that there is an unbroken chain of
psychologically continuous “sub-persons”: Methuselah-25 is the same person as
Methuselah-26, who is the same person as Methuselah-27.... all the way up to
Methuselah-968, who is the same person as Methuselah-969. And this is as it
should be. The closer in time that two individuals are to each other, the more
overlap we should expect to find in their psychological states. Methuselah-25
should be closer to Methuselah-26 than Methuselah-27 and so on.
It is not surprising that I should plump for psychological continuity as the
necessary criterion for personal identity: according to my theory, objects in
general are arbitrary constructions, and hence being this-or-that person has no
ontological significance, other than acting as a pointer in indexical propositions.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of the argument to come I shall give a definition of
same-personhood:
The property for y of  “being the same person as x” is a relation
(call it the p-relation) between the two individuals involved.
Person-stages x and y are p-related iff there exists a chain of
psychological continuity between the intermediate stages (if any)
between the prior state x and later state y of the postulated person.
It should be noted that the criterion is one of subjective continuity: we should not
consider the integrity of our personhood to be compromised if we were to
undergo a lengthy hiatus of our mental faculties (cryogenic suspension, for
example): such a situation is not different in principle from emerging from a
coma or even waking up in the morning. Another more speculative scenario
might occur if “brain-taping” were feasible: persons might serially “time-share” a
single body, each person having a continuous, if interrupted, psychological
history: in this case we would have two persons inhabiting (at different times) a
single body.63
                                                
63This is not so far-fetched: patients with multiple-personality-disorder (MPD) may exhibit
several different selves, although some of the personalities are more fully realized than others.
(see e.g. Dennett (1991), ch.13.) In court cases, MPD patients have used the defense that one
personality cannot be held responsible for the actions of another; this is surely indicative of the
idea that we are here dealing with seperate moral agents.
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What of one person simultaneously existing twice? Parfit’s Martian
Teletransporter64 is perhaps the best intuition pump (to use a phrase coined by
Dennett) regarding personal fission without split-brain scenarios and their
attendant neurological overtones and right-brain - left-brain questions about
whether the whole person is involved. Teletransportation to Mars (Case 1, below)
involves the scanning of one’s body (destroying the body in the process), the
electronic transferral of that information to Mars, and the replication of an exact,
p-related copy of the body on Mars. One “wakes up” from the process on Mars,
none the worse for wear for the journey, and apparently, the same person. By the
criteria given above, certainly, one is the same person as before, as any self-
respecting materialist would enthusiastically agree. Later, advances in technology
make it possible to scan the body without destroying the original in the process
(Case 2). Instead of passing out on Earth and waking on Mars, the would-be
transportee remains conscious and walks out of the transport booth as if nothing
had happened. On Mars, an exact replica has been created as before.
x
y
x
yzCase 1
Case 2
Earth
MarsMars
Earth
Fig. 7
If the machine had not worked at all, then there is no doubt that the person who
walked out of the original booth would be the same person who walked in. Yet,
on previous occasions, the person’s body had been destroyed and copied on Mars,
where the same person, instantiated in a qualitatively if not numerically identical
body, had emerged. It is not credible to maintain that individual z in case 2 is not
the same person as x, and it seems equally incredible to deny that y in case 2 is
not also the same person as x: after all, in case 1, y and x were the same person,
                                                
64Parfit (1986), pp.199-200
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and nothing has happened to y that did not happen in case 1. It seems, then, that
both y and z are p-related to, and hence the same person as, x.
Now comes the twist. In Case 2, the scanning process, while not destroying x’s
body, harmed it such that z will die a short time after the “transport”. Now if both
z and y are the same person as x, then z should not mind dying; after all, y is still
around to carry out x’s duties, fulfil their plans, love their loves and so on. Of
course, this is no consolation at all. What has gone wrong? Obviously, while x is
the same person as y and x is also the same person as z, it not true that y is the
same person as z. If “being the same person as x” were a relation of identity, then
the transitivity of identity would guarantee that if x=y and x=z, then y=z.
What is important for z  (call her Zelda) is not that a personality that is similar to,
or even exactly like hers will continue: it is that she will continue - the “she” of
Zelda’s here-and-now. Zelda would find it small consolation to be told that upon
her death a clone, implanted with her memories up to the point of entering the
transport booth, would be animated in her place. She would feel, not
unreasonably, that she would be dying and that someone else would be taking her
place. Why? Because near-death-Zelda and Zelda’s clone are not p-related in the
appropriate way. It is a commonplace that we are fearful about what will happen
to us in the future, not what has happened in the past: the knowledge, for
example, of an infelicitous event in our past may cause us regret and we may
even wish that it had not happened, but it does not occasion fear and a desire to
avoid it as with an imagined future misfortune. Zelda’s clone is psychologically
prior to near-death-Zelda; as such, near-death-Zelda can no more find comfort in
the survival of her clone than she could in hearing about past experiences of
which she can have no recollection. Near-death-Zelda is concerned that the
person that she will become will live, not that a person that she once was will
enjoy a life that she, near-death-Zelda, will be denied.65
It is perhaps most appropriate to understand z and y as two distinct four-
dimensional objects which share some early time-slices. If identity is the
condition of having a certain set of facts pertaining to them, then objects are
distinguished by there being different things true of them: in the case of
                                                
65Here is an interesting question for consequentialists: is it permissible to kill someone without
their prior knowledge (blowing their brains out from behind, say, or killing them in their sleep)
and then to immediately animate a clone with their memories up to that point?
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propositions referring to the pre-fission shared time-slices, the two objects will be
referred to by the same true propositions.
One might object that if there are two four-dimensional persons, then, of the pre-
fission time-slices of the four-dimensional person(s), in one case “this person will
go on to live a happy life on Mars” is true, whereas of the other, “this person will
go on to life a miserable death on Earth” is true. If this is the case, then how can
the two four-dimensional persons share those pre-fission time slices? Recall the
theory of temporal truth. Although we can, ex post facto, or indeed from the
rarefied atmosphere of a timeless viewpoint, distinguish two four-dimensional
individuals, propositions whose time of assertion is prior to fission and which
refer to post-fission individuals are not assigned a truth-value. The only
propositions which could potentially disambiguate those individuals are of this
sort. There is, therefore –before fission– nothing true of one which is not also true
of the other.
An important consideration to remember when dealing with cases of fission is
that personalities will very quickly diverge. Even if we thought that the two
individuals were the same person at the instant of fission, subsequent experiences
will give rise to differing perspectives. In Case 2 above, the personality of Zelda,
minutes after the unfortunate experience in the transport booth, will already be
quite different from that of y: to begin with, y has not been informed of her
imminent demise. If, on the other hand, fission resulted in two individuals who
were subject to exactly the same stimuli, then we might have a case of two
numerically distinct but otherwise identical individuals: we might as well call
them the same person. “They” will not know the difference, or even know which
one they are. Suppose that the teletransportation device destroys the original body
as before, and that not one but two copies are made, one on Mars and the other on
sraM, which orbits on the opposite side of the sun as Mars, but is otherwise
exactly the same. There is no way of distinguishing the two planets: they have the
same features, inhabitants, and so on66. The copied bodies will have precisely the
same experiences: indeed, anything that we can predicate of one, we can
predicate of the other - at least from their own point of view. They are
                                                
66In this hypothetical situation one is not allowed to ask about transmission times to Earth,
seasonal variations, the stars at night and the like. Consider them ex cathedra declared the same.
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subjectively indiscernible, and hence subjectively identical. I do not see a
meaningful way of distinguishing these two individuals. They are, to all intents
and purposes, the same person. Not only do they both have a strong
psychological connection with their “original” selves, but they are strongly
psychologically connected to each other - as strongly as possible. Each of them is
closer to the other than to their future or past selves; indeed, to anything else.
It must be noted, however, that the relation by which simultaneously existing
indiscernible individuals may be considered the same person is not the p-relation
by which different temporal stages of a space-time worm are held to constitute
parts of a continuing person. Call this new relation between individuals the i-
relation: individuals x and y are i-related iff x and y, are, from the point of view of
x and y, indistinguishable. The p-relation obtains between different but similar
objects which stand in a certain temporal relation: the chains of psychological
continuity involve an accretion of experience from past to future. The temporal
asymmetry of the p-relation is, however, not necessarily causal in character. It is
certainly the case that the temporal asymmetry of the ordering of psychological
states has evolved in the context of, and is contingently dependent on, chains of
causation between neural states, and there will generally be a causal connection
found between two parts of the same person, but it is not constitutive of
continuing personhood. We normally find that psychologically connected
individuals are also causally connected (by virtue of their being part of the same
space-time worm), but causal connection is neither sufficient nor necessary for
personal continuance.
Suppose that there were an ingenious but considerably less reliable way of getting
to Mars than using Parfit’s Teletransporter. On Earth, a sleeping x is crushed by a
falling turtle, while simultaneously, on Mars, a chance explosion in a vat of
chemicals results in the appearance of a molecule-for-molecule replica of x’s
(pre-turtle) body. If what Everett calls the “principle of psycho-physical
parallelism” holds, x and the person on Mars are p-related; from the point of view
of the person on Mars, it is as if she fell asleep on Earth and woke up on Mars.
Even in the absence of a causal connection, the psychological connection is
sufficient for the assertion of personal continuance.
I do not think that there is a determinate answer to the question of how closely
one state has to be to the next to qualify for same-personhood. It is difficult to see
how one could quantify personalities such that there was, say, a requirement that
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ninety percent of stage x’s personality had to be present in y in order to qualify. I
do not think that it is wholly subjective - that if y thinks they are the same person
as x, then they are. There are those individuals who have delusions as to their
identity. I might think that I am Julius Caesar, but (a) I strongly doubt that I could
have anything like the full range of memories, traits, and the like of the real
Caesar, and (b) more importantly, I would fall foul of the requirement that there
be an unbroken chain of psychological resemblances between the stages of this
space-time worm-bundle and one of two thousand years ago. If some crazed
neuro-historian were able to alter my brain such that  my personality was p-
related to, say, Caesar as a young man (and necessarily extinguishing my original
personality, and hence bringing to an end Michael Honey as a person in the
process), then we should probably have to agree that “we” were the same person,
and that Caesar had undergone a strange time-lapsed fission, one strand going on
to be killed on the Ides of March, and the other, after an interregnum of some
twenty centuries, finding himself confused by modern plumbing. But we should
not be surprised that our notions of personhood are inadequate to deal with
circumstances we have not nor are likely to encounter.
 
Living in multiple worlds
Having provided an account of personal “identity” for the four-dimensional
universe, it remains to transfer this analysis to the multiverse of subjunctive
realism. As discussed earlier, according to the Everett interpretation of quantum
mechanics, the entire system (ie the universe) which contains a quantum-
mechanical event with multiple possible results branches into multiple states
representing the various possibilities. As parts of that system, persons within that
universe will also branch into several states. The situation is quite similar to that
of the Martian Teletransporter above, but, with only one person to each world,
there is less chance of having conflicting claims of same-personhood. Just as a
world is any path along the multiversal tree, so a person, multiversally
considered, is one path along a branching space-time worm, cross-sections of
which are spatial parts of the worlds which they inhabit. Just as worlds may share
parts with other worlds, so may people share their earlier selves with others. An
alternative but equivalent formulation, as described above, is to consider a person
as a four-dimensional object which may share some temporal parts with other
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four-dimensional objects, in the same way as the road to Rangoon may share
some parts with the road to Mandalay.
Physicist X performs an experiment on a quantum-
mechanical system. The apparatus is set up such that
there is a fifty-percent probability of there being one
of two results, A and B. When the event in question
occurs, the world branches, one branch for each
result. Each of the branches contains a physicist: in
one case the physicist is experiencing result A, and in
the other world, result B. It is clear that each of the
two branch-physicists is p-related to their selves prior
to the experiment: in fact, they are both p-related to the one pre-experiment
physicist, X. Space-time worms Physicist A and Physicist B share those parts
which occur before t0. Physicists A and B, however, are not identical: they are
different in so far as one of them has noted that result A has obtained, and the
other, result B. The proposition uttered by Physicist A  —“result A has
obtained”— is true because the truth of the expanded locution “this is a world
where result A has obtained” requires that it is Physicist A’s world, and not B’s,
where that proposition is expressed.
Note, however, that Physicist A does not become Physicist A until the relevant
proposition —“result A has obtained”— becomes true at time t0.67 According to
the theory of temporal truth, a proposition (here treating the original proposition
tenselessly:  “result A obtains at t0”) is not assigned a truth value until its time of
reference is reached. Where the time of assertion is prior to the time of reference,
a proposition can only be assigned a truth value if sufficient conditions exist to
guarantee its truth or falsity at the time of assertion (rule (ii), page 20). In terms
of the branching multiverse, a proposition about the future can only be true now if
on all future branches that proposition is true — quite a tall order, when one
considers how frequently and how densely the branches proliferate.68
The open future
As the branches proliferate, so do the observers who are part of the branching
system. Herein lies the difference between the past and the future: one has been
                                                
67Or possibly even later: see “To whom does “I” refer”, below.
68The vast majority of those branches will be trivially dissimilar and hence will for the most part
make true the same propositions, but Everett’s theory requires that even the most improbable
events are included in the branching.
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only one person, but will become many. Propositions about the past have
determinate truth-values because they indexically refer to a single world-path.69
Propositions about the future, on the other hand, refer to a host of possible future
world-paths (and hence, possible future selves for the holder of the proposition),
and any proposition whose truth or falsity is not analytic will be true in some of
those worlds and false in others. “P v ~P” is true of any future proposition; future
world-paths contain either P or ~P. Neither of the disjuncts is yet true (or false),
however, or, alternatively, both are true — but only at some future stage.
There is a genuine ambiguity regarding which world one is referring to when
speaking about the future. Physicist X at t-1 is unable to unambiguously refer to
his or her future “self”, since that self will n-furcate at t0: the proposition “result
A obtains at t1”, then, cannot be true or false at t-1 not because the question hasn’t
been resolved (it is70 at t 0), but because, at t -1, Physicist X cannot know whether
he or she is talking about future self A or future self B. Physicists A and B,
however, have no problem referring to Physicist X as part of their respective
pasts, since there is no ambiguity about to whom propositions regarding the past
refer.
One of the virtues of the theory, then, is that it provides an account of temporal
asymmetry based on a legitimate distinction between the past and the future
which does not depend on mysterious ontological differences between them (the
past having “happened”, unlike the future, or some such), nor on purely
psychological reasons (such as the fact that we remember the past but not the
future), such as are held by proponents of the “naive” and the four-dimensional
models respectively.
It is notable that while there seem to be many possible futures open to us, only
one actually eventuates. It is tempting to think that for all its apparent openness,
we each have only one future now. Roger Penrose appears to have fallen foul of
this confusion. He considers a branching multiverse with apprehension:
One could envisage different conscious observers threading different
routes through the myriad of branches.... each such an observer would
have a different subjective view of the world. ...I feel particularly
uncomfortable about my friends having all (presumably) disappeared
                                                
69Or indistinguishable groups thereof. See “To whom does “I” refer”, below.
70“Is” is here used tenselessly.
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down different branches of the universe, leaving me with nothing but
unconscious zombies to talk to!71
It is hard to believe that a physicist would imagine that the difference between
one world-branch and another is enough to strip a person of their self-
consciousness. What Penrose appears to be suggesting is that whenever a world-
branching takes place, conscious observers “thread” their way down one branch
but not the other(s). Physicist X, for example, might go down one branch,
becoming Physicist A. Physicist B, meanwhile, still completes the experiment,
but without appreciating it – “she” is just an automaton. Why should this be so?
Physicist B is almost indistinguishable from Physicist A: the only difference is
that they have observed different experimental results.
Perhaps Penrose is a closet dualist, believing that there is only one “soul” per
person, the other-worldly bodies behaving the same way, but as “unconscious
zombies”. He would still have the problem, however, of explaining why this
world is the one blessed with his consciousness, and not another. This
arbitrariness is not a problem for subjunctive realism: all future worlds from this
point contain a consciousness which is p-related to myself (until, of course “I”
die). The future is open, but not in the sense that we do not know which of our
possible futures we will experience: in a sense, “we” will experience all of them.
We will, however, only be able to experience one at a time. Rather than
individuals “threading” their way through the multiversal tree, each person wildly
proliferates at each juncture. This is what gives the future its indeterminate
character: each of us has, as “descendants”, many individuals who “are the same
person” as ourselves, but who are non-identical with each other. I am p-related to
the future individuals who I will become, but those individuals will not all be i-
related to each other. If they were all i-related, then the future would not be open,
since all of my future selves, and the worlds in which they live, would be
indistinguishable.
To whom does “I” refer?
Suppose, now, that our physicist’s experiment is such that the outcome is not
known until after the result is supposed to have occurred. Suppose that the
physicist is looking at an impermeable box which contains a cat, a cat which may
or may not be alive, depending on the result of a subatomic event which has taken
place, unobserved, some time earlier. According to the analysis above, the
                                                
71Penrose (1979), p.595. See also Penrose (1987), p.107. Note that what Penrose calls the
“universe” (and later, the “omnium”!), I call the “multiverse”.
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universe branches when the quantum-mechanical event occurs such that there are
branches for each of the results. Before the experiment begins, we have Physicist
X. After the box is opened, we have Physicist Dead and Physicist Alive. But
when did the personalities divide? Ex hypothesi, Physicist X does not know the
outcome of the experiment until after the event on which the experiment depends
is supposed to have occurred. Nevertheless, the untutored assumption is that the
result does not depend on our opening the box. Certainly, our everyday
experience would suggest that the cat is either dead or alive, independent of
whether we are able to look at it or not. Yet the mathematics says that
Schrödinger’s thought experiment means that the cat is in a superposition of
states —neither dead nor alive— until the box is opened.72 When the box is
finally opened, the wave function “collapses” and the cat is seen either dead or
alive. It is not yet clear, however, when Physicist X becomes Physicist Dead or
Physicist Alive.
Sometimes —the vast majority of times— we are unaware of quantum-
mechanical events occurring. Branching takes place whenever such an event
happens (subject to the relativistic considerations given earlier), and much of the
time it makes no difference anyway: macroscopic objects contain so many
systems that micro-events are statistically insignificant. Even where it does make
a difference on the macro-scale, we may be unaware because the difference in
question is currently73 below our level of discrimination. Suppose that a chance
movement of air molecules, caused by a quantum-mechanical event, causes an
extra piece of lint to lodge in my belly button. Even if it occurred to me to navel-
gaze, I would not notice one more or less piece of lint therein. Yet according to
the theory so far, I (along with the rest of the world) have branched into lint-
designated states Michael-27 and Michael-28. If I were to conduct a rigorous
examination, I could not doubt count the pieces of lint: Michael-27 could
truthfully say “this is a world where I have twenty-seven pieces of lint in my
navel”. Yet we would normally understand that I, Michael-27, was Michael-27
before I counted: in other words, I have a definite place on the multiversal tree,
but I don’t know quite where. Of course, the frequency of quantum-mechanical
events is such that I am branching millions of times per second, and it is
practically impossible to ever know precisely which possible world is the actual
one, but the natural understanding is that despite that impossibility, I have a
                                                
72See e.g. DeWitt (1970), pp. 160-161
73“Currently”, because events might take time to percolate up through chains of causation to a
level which we can appreciate.
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definite multiversal location which can be approached (however asymptotically)
by empirical investigations. “I” accordingly designates a specific but unknown
multiversal individual: a particular path along the many-headed space-time worm
which represents myself and the other ways that I might have been.
Consider, however, Schrödinger’s cat. If “I” were to refer to a distinct but
unspecified multiversal individual from the moment of the quantum-physical
event, then, contrary to the mathematics, the cat would not be in a superposition
of states at all prior to the opening of the box. If Physicist X were to become
Physicist Dead at the supposed moment of the event taking place, then the cat
would have been dead from that moment: the wave function would collapse
immediately, and not upon the observation following the opening of the box.
Furthermore, a precise and unique specification of one’s multiversal location
requires a conjunction of indexical propositions which refer to the facts about the
world: “this is a world where x is the case, and this is a world where y is the
case....” and so on, for every truth about the actual world: in other words, a
precise description of the universe. Such a specification is impossible, however,
due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle; such a conjunction would contain a
specification of both the position and momentum of any given particle, which is
forbidden. There is an ineradicable locus of uncertainty regarding one’s precise
location in the multiverse. Indeed, there is some difficulty in asserting one’s
spatio-temporal location in this world. Dennett has argued convincingly74 that
consciousness, rather than mysteriously “happening” in a quasi-Cartesian fashion
at some point in the skull, is distributed in both time and place within the brain. If
our personalities are dispersed in space and time, then there is no definite time at
which our personalities n-furcate during world-branchings, since the “wavefront”
of world-branching will reach different parts of the brain at different times.
This is, of course, quite apart from the impossibility and indeed unnecessariness
of such a specification. Even if it were possible to describe the universe with such
exactitude, it is hard to see how, for example, I am different from my other-
worldly counterpart who inhabits the possible world where the Sahara has one
less grain of sand than in this one. An alternative position to the view that one
exists at a definite location in the multiverse is to understand personhood as
“spread out” over several worlds. The explanation I propose is as follows: “I”
refers at any given time, to that group of individuals, across an unspecified
                                                
74Dennett (1991), ch. 5 and passim.
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number of possible worlds, who assent to the same propositions75 and who share
the same beliefs. In other words, I am those people whom I cannot distinguish
from myself. I do not know, for example, how many hairs are on my head. Let us
say that there is an individual —an individual whom I believe to be myself—
who has 110,028 hairs on his head and who believes everything that “I” believe:
that he is Michael Honey, that he has approximately one hundred thousand hairs
on his head, that there are nine books on his desk, and so on. Another individual,
who has, unbeknownst to himself, one more hair than “I”, lives in a world which
is subjectively identical to the first (that is, those differences between the first
individual and the second are below the threshold of his perception), and
naturally believes the same things. Until this discrepancy is brought to “our”
attention (that is, until we have our heads examined), we are the same person.
And why not? We are psychologically speaking, indiscernible, and since being
this-or-that person is a psychological matter, we are, psychologically speaking,
identical.
Lewis rejects branching of worlds in part because he considers as insoluble what
he calls the “problem of accidental intrinsics”76. Accidentally intrinsic properties
of myself are properties which are rightly mine (that is, genuine properties of
myself, not  relational ones such as being in the same world as David Lewis) but
which are not essential to my being, properties such as the number of fingers
which I possess.77 Now if worlds can branch and, with them their inhabitants,
then  I can exist in more than one world at once. This would be called
“transworld identity”, and would consist in Michael, the same Michael (not this
Michael and my other-worldly counterparts), existing simultaneously in many
worlds. This is all very well if that which differentiates the worlds is extrinsic to
my person, but if the worlds are differentiated, say by my having one more finger
in one world than the other, then we are stuck with the contradictory situation of
my having both five and six fingers on one hand!
                                                
75Propositions, that is, of the right sort. The ones I have in mind are those of the sort used by
McCall: “space-time point (x,y,z,t) is characterised by property p” or some such. These
propositions will include a description of the world (including the self) from the individual’s point
of view.
76Lewis (1986), pp. 201-209.
77If a property is essential, then changing it from world to world does not involve a problem of
transworld identity, since changing an essential property will change who I am. There is of course
the question of which properties are indeed essential are which are not: hair colour? eye colour?
skin colour? sex?  species?
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I happen to agree with Lewis, with regard to transworld identity: it is
unacceptable that a transworld person78 should have (as the same person)
accidental intrinsics which differ from world to world. This, however, is not a
problem for my theory: if a purported “person” were to have five fingers at one
world and six at another, then they would not be the same person. Counterparts,
certainly: but having one more or less finger is quite enough of a difference for a
person to notice, and so they are by definition different people. The way that a
person exists simultaneously in different worlds  is, for me, not by transworld
identity, but by a restricted transworld similarity. I have said that if there are
differences between transworld individuals which are too small to notice, then
those individuals are considered as one person: as soon, however, as the
difference is noticed, the persons diverge from that point.
The indistinguishable differences which will be
relevant, of course, are unobserved quantum-
mechanical events. Each multiversal juncture is the
result of such an event, but their effects may not
become apparent for some time, if at all. Returning
to Schrödinger’s cat, we now have a way out of the
confusion about when the cat dies or lives. From a
“God’s-eye” perspective, we see that the quantum
event at t0 which sets off (or fails to set off) the poison device causes the world to
branch into separate worlds for each result. Physicist X, looking at the closed
box, exists in both these worlds. While the box is closed an there is no way of
knowing the result of the experiment: those individuals who exist between  t0 and
t1 (when the box is opened) are i-related —they believe that they will soon know
the results of the experiment, they do not know what it will be, and so on—  and
hence are the same person, Physicist X. At t1, the box is opened and the
psychologies of the individuals will diverge: Physicist Alive seeing a live cat and
Physicist Dead a dead one. The indeterminacy which we experience is not as a
result of the multiverse as a whole exhibiting randomness (Everett states
categorically that the state vector as a whole evolves according to the
deterministic Schrödinger equations); rather it is because there is no determinate
                                                
78"Transworld individual" is the more normal phrase, but I have specified that the term
"individual" shall refer to worldbound time-slices. "Person" will do in this case.
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answer to the question, posed of Physicist X, “will you see a dead cat or a living
one when you open the box?”.79
The existence of a number of individuals who are i-related leads to an interesting
problem regarding the transitivity or otherwise of that relation. Call a “person” a
sum, not only of this-worldly temporal parts, but of many-worldly parts, parts
which are subjectively indistinguishable. Counterparts, on the other hand, are
individuals (or indistinguishable sums thereof) who are p-related to earlier
individuals to whom one is p-related oneself, but who are not i-related to oneself.
Now, if the i-relation were transitive in the manner of the identity-relation, then if
individual A is i-related to B and B is i-related to C, then A would be i-related to
C. Not necessarily so. Suppose that the differences between A and B and B and C
are just below the threshold of perception. While A and B (and B and C) cannot
tell each other apart, it may be that enough difference has accumulated (hairs on
the head, lint in the navel, sand in the Sahara) that A and C are distinguishable,
and hence are counterparts rather than the same person. There may be, therefore,
parts of my counterparts which are not parts of myself.80
The stipulation that indistinguishable (i-related) individuals should be considered
as parts of the same person has as its motivation the necessity of keeping the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in agreement with
experimental results, both empirical and gedanken-, and in particular the
requirement of the Copenhagen interpretation that quantum-mechanical systems
cannot be assigned states unless they are observed:
                                                
79“But surely”, one could say, “there is a fact of the matter  about whether one is a different
person or not: after all, just because we can’t tell the difference, it doesn’t mean there isn’t one.” I
might agree, if being this-or-that person meant belonging to a special metaphysical category, of if
causal connection were a necessary criterion of personal identity. Personhood, however, is a
psychological matter, so the subjective, psychological indistinguishability of one state from
another is the important thing.
80It will be objected that the definition of “counterpart” above is too narrow. What of individuals
whose worlds branched from mine before I was born? We should perhaps distinguish two groups
of counterparts: those that are, as above, p-related cousin-like offshoots of earlier temporal parts
of oneself, and more distant counterparts who occupy analogous positions to oneself in their
respective worlds, worlds which have branched before one was born. This is not an arbitrary
distinction. There is certainly a possible world where I have lost a finger by accident: it is a way
that I might plausibly have been.  What, though, of the possible world where all humans have nine
fingers? Is this a way that I might have been, or is it a way that someone like me might have
been?
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...the concept of the probability function does not allow a description of
what happens between two observations. Any attempt to find such a
description would lead to contradictions; this must mean that the term
“happen” is restricted to the observation. ...The observation itself
changes the probability function discontinuously; it selects of all
possible events the actual one which has taken place. ....the transition
from the “possible” to the “actual” takes place during the act of
observation.81
This denial of an objective reality —the denial of objective states of unobserved
systems— has as its parallel the rejection of the notion of a specific, unique
multiversal location for the observer prior to making an observation. The
different analyses of the Schrödinger thought experiment make it clear that the
two requirements are analogous.
In both interpretations, observations cause the system at hand to jump
discontinuously to a particular state out of a range of possible states: that new
state in turn provides information which can be used to calculate a range of
possible values for the next measurement. The difference is that in the
Copenhagen interpretation, possibilia —unobserved states— have no objective
reality. In subjunctive realism, the wave-function is thought to describe the entire
system at all times: those possibilities are real, but not actual. States can only be
actualised by their being observed. The observation causes the consciousness of
the observer to n-furcate. Following that n-furcation, the possibilia once again
mount up, and the observer’s multiversal position is indeterminate until the next
observation.
One way for there to be no doubt about which multiversal branch one occupied
would be if there were no other branches. The “acid-rain” version of subjunctive
realism has been mentioned in passing. In this theory, unactualised possibilities
are discarded, à la McCall: branches drop off at each juncture as the observer’s
present reaches them, leaving only the actual world. This process is analogous to
the collapse of the wave-function as described by  Heisenberg above: the
observation picks out the actual world from the possible ones and discards the
rest. In opposition to this view is subjunctive realism proper, where, as the name
implies, the “way that things might have been”,  still exists.
                                                
81Heisenberg (1958), pp 405,407.
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Recent developments along the lines of the two-slit experiment seem to indicate
that the collapse of the wave function is not irreversible. Horgan describes an
experiment where wavelike behaviour can be destroyed and then restored:
Pairs of identically polarized photons produced by a down-converter
bounce off mirrors, converge again at a beam-splitter as pass into two
detectors. A coincidence counter observes an interference pattern in the
rate of simultaneous detections by the two detectors, indicating that each
photon has gone both ways at the beam splitter, like a wave. Adding a
polarization shifter to one path destroys the pattern by making it
possible to distinguish the photons. But placing two polarizing filters in
front of the detectors makes the photons identical again, erasing the
polarization distinction and restoring the interference pattern.82
If the unactualised possibilities given by the wave function were discarded,
leaving only one world, then the collapse of the wave function would be
irreversible. Yet the experiment described shows that observations can be, as it
were, retracted.
Observer-correlated actuality
In classical physics, the universe is supposed to be independent of the scientist
who studies it: the role of the observer is that of a passive recorder of pre-existing
facts about the world. Even the so-called secondary qualities such as colour are
reducible to such facts, and those facts exist even if we are not there to observe
them. In quantum physics, however, as the experiments described above show,
the role of the observer is more central. The observer is apparently able to make
light behave either as a wave or as a particle, merely by choosing to observe it. In
Schrödinger’s thought-experiment, it is curiosity, as John Gribbin has wryly
noted, that kills the cat. In the “EPR paradox”, the observation of one of a pair of
correlated particles seems to cause the other in the pair —even if is light-years
away— to instantaneously assume an associated state, apparent violating the
principle of local causation. These considerations have given rise to the concept
of the “observer-created reality”, where the observation picks out from the
multiple possibilities given by the wave-function one state which is reified,
becoming the way the world is. This notion has in turn given credence, however
ill-advisedly, to a number of theories which attempt to find a rapprochement
between quantum physics and mysticism, both eastern and western.
Subjunctive realism puts the relationship between the observer and the observed
back in perspective. The multiverse as a whole is unaffected by the actions of the
                                                
82Horgan (1992), p 77.
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observer. True, the actual world is that which is observed, but the term “actual” is
indexical, and there are as many observers as there are worlds. In place of an
observer-created reality, subjunctive realism supplies an observer-correlated
actuality: observations affect the actual world, not by effecting multiversal
changes but by deciding which world is the actual one.
Whether an observation is made or not, there are branches of the multiverse
where Schrödinger’s cat is alive, and some where it is dead: the observation splits
the observer’s consciousness such that each branch-consciousness experiences
—and hence calls actual— either a dead cat or a living one. The pre-observation
indeterminacy is the multiversal analogue of the superposition of states familiar
to the quantum physicist.
In the case of EPR particle-pairs, there are branches for each possible set of
correlative states of the particles, and the observation of one particle, rather than
mysteriously forcing the other particle to assume a correlated state, tells the
observer which world is actual, and therefore which state the distant particle is in.
The question of whether the principle of local causation is violated is unnecessary
because “If particle 1 is in state x, then particle 2 is in state y” indicates a logical
implication rather than a causal connection. This is not to say, however, that the
observer merely infers from the fact that particle 1 is in state x that particle 2 is in
state y: the observation of particle 1 in a certain state makes actual the world
where it is in that state, and thereby makes actual other parts of that world.
Final considerations
Before closing, there are two considerations which I believe may be of interest,
although they are not within the scope of this work.
Firstly: the basis for subjunctive realism is the interpretation of the physical laws
to which we find ourselves subject. It may be, however, that in thinking that
“our” multiverse contains all the nomologically possible world-states, we are
guilty of chauvinism towards our own physics. We should give consideration to
the possibility that the multiverse described in this paper is only a branch of a
larger “omniverse” (for want of a yet more inclusive term) which includes other
initial conditions and physical laws. It should be noted that in a quantized
universe of a finite size, there are only a finite number of non-trivially different
laws of physics: that is, there are only a finite number of non-trivially different
paths through a quantized phase-space of a given size. Other multiverses may not
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be quantized, however: in some, the properties of the world-stuff may be
continuously variable. In others, there may be an infinite amount of world-stuff.
If, as has been postulated, the laws of physics as we know them arose during the
very early universe, and if it were possible that the laws might have been
otherwise then it may be that those other multiverses are connected to this one at
that very early stage.
Secondly, there is the question of whether accepting subjunctive realism would
(or should) change the way we conduct our lives. David Lewis discusses whether
(with regard to modal realism) a many-worlds metaphysics where actuality is
merely indexical might be thought ethically problematic:
...Thus a modal realist should be indifferent to this-worldly evils. There
would be the same sum total of good and of evil throughout the worlds,
no matter which world is ours. And he needn’t bother what he does;
there would be the same sum total no matter how he acted. ...it is futile
to live a good life and attempt to eradicate evil - the evil you have gone
to the trouble of preventing just happens off in another world.83
Lewis regards this view as mistaken, as do I. One can distinguish two reasons for
his rejection of this “road to indifference”. In the first case, he points out that it is
futile to want the whole system of worlds to satisfy a condition (say, for there to
be less evil in the sum total of all the worlds), because it is not a contingent
matter. Secondly, and particularly in the case of prudential wants (such as the
desire not to die), it is not the case that I want someone, somewhere to live: I
want me to live.
A consequentialist ethical theory is therefore inappropriate for a many-worlds
metaphysics, if that consequentialism is supposed to be universally
(multiversally?) applicable, since the consequences will in toto be the same
whatever happens in this world. It may be, for example, that a virtue theory of
ethics is more appropriate. It must be noted, however, that the branching worlds
of subjunctive realism do make problematic decisions about the future. There is a
sense in which it does not matter what I decide to do, since my future selves will
between them experience all nomologically possible alternatives. It does make
sense, however, to hope to maximise my opportunity to enjoy the desired future
and avoid a horrible one by taking action. Most macroscopic phenomena
transcend their quantum beginnings, as has been noted, any indeterminacies being
statistically swamped due to the sheer number of particles involved. If, say, I
                                                
83Lewis (1986), p 123 and note.
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choose to step out of the path an oncoming vehicle, then there will be a great
many worlds where I avoid the vehicle, since hardly any of the manifold quantum
indeterminacies which cause branches from that point will appreciably affect the
motion of the vehicle or myself. In maximising the number of future selves who
avoid being mashed by the oncoming vehicle, I improve my present self’s chance
of being p-related to happy persons. Unlike in Lewis’ worlds, what I do here and
now can make a difference to a great many other worlds, namely those which
branch off from the one I now inhabit.
Conclusion
There are three main strands of thought running through this work. The first is
Everett’s many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The interpretation
states that the quantum-physical wave function describes a branching system,
with branches for each possible observational result. The entire universe,
including the observer, branches: all of the branches are equally real. The wave
function, rather than “collapsing”, is understood to describe the entire system at
all times. The system as a whole evolves deterministically, but it is subjectively
discontinuous and probabilistic, because each observer only ever experiences part
of the superposition.
The second strand is the theory of temporal truth. Propositions about the future
are not assigned truth-values until their time of reference is reached or antecedent
conditions guarantee their future truth. In a deterministic world, all propositions
will either be true or false: in a world where chance appears to play some part (in,
say, quantum-physical phenomena), propositions about the future will be of
indeterminate truth-value.
The third strand involves a theory of personal identity, required because truth-
functional empirical propositions are in effect asserting the location of the
speaker within the superposition of possible worlds. Since these worlds are,
according to Everett’s theory, branching uncountably rapidly, a theory which can
cope with the n-furcation of the observer is needed: a theory based on psycho-
logical continuity is proposed. In addition to the familiar relation of being the
same person over time (the p-relation), a relation which exists between two
numerically distinct but subjectively indistinguishable individuals (the i-relation)
is postulated.
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From this basis I have argued for two independent results. The first result is an
explanation of the asymmetry between past and future. In the branching
multiverse, an individual is p-related to many branch-persons in the future but to
only one in the past. The different future individuals live in worlds which make
different propositions true. The future is therefore open: propositions of the type
“x will occur” will be of indeterminate truth value, since, unless xis necessary, x
is the case in some future branches but not in others.
The second, more speculative result is that we may be considered as concurrently
existing in multiple worlds. The i-relation might hold between numerically
distinct individuals who are performing a quantum-physical experiment where
the system (along with the observers) has branched according to Everett’s theory
but where an observation has not yet been made. The worlds which these
observers inhabit are almost identical; only the quantum-physical event
differentiates them. If that event has not been observed, those individuals are
subjectively indistinguishable, and hence, according to the theory of personal
identity espoused, they are the same person.
This result, while outlandish, is of utility in explaining quantum-physical
phenomena. Acceptance of this result should be predicated, however, on a further
analysis of the interpretation of the wave-particle duality, particularly in its
connection with the interference patterns experienced in the two-slit experiment.
It may be that an appropriate theory of perception is needed to make such an
analysis coherent. Another area which may prove fruitful, given the first result, is
an examination of irreversible processes in relation to the branching multiverse.
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